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Although the Internal Revenue Service affords preseizure due process tights to the
recipients of fraudulently conveyed property in a tax collection action, it does not afford similar
rights to alleged nominees of the tax debtor The sole legal dhfference between these groups,
according to the Internal Revenue Service, is the intent of the transferor as determined by the
collection agent assigned to the case. We argue that this ditinction is not a meaningful
determinant of the appropriate level of due process afforded to each group in the lien stage of
tax collection actions and that alleged nominees must be afforded the same modicum of
protection given to tax debtors and the recipients offiaudulently conveyed property The cntical
inquiiy whether the Service may lien upon and later seize property in someone s possession
without a preseizure review, has the same import for each group. Therefore, preseizure due
process rights afforded by Congress to the recipients of fraudulently conveyed property should
apply to both groups or to neither
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I. INTRODUCTION
Margo had no idea, when she met Henry at the Sunnyway Food
Market, that the Internal Revenue Service would seize her modest
Greencastle, Pennsylvania, home. She was a check-out clerk, and
Henry, a handsome and talented cash-and-carry carpenter, swept her
off of her feet. Within months, she had moved into his townhouse, just
a couple of miles from 1-81. The couple shared a car and shared their
savings so that Margo could work part-time. When their romance
faded, they parted on friendly terms. Henry transferred the townhouse
to Margo and he, in turn, took the couple's savings and bought an
identical townhouse two blocks away.
Unbeknownst to Margo, Henry was an Ayn Rand devotee who
had not filed a tax return or paid a single cent of taxes in over ten
years. When the Internal Revenue Service finally caught up with him,
he owed more than $300,000 to the government. It filed a notice of
federal tax lien against Henry, but finding the value of his assets
(including the townhouse) insufficient to cover the debt, the Internal
Revenue Service filed a notice of federal tax lien against Margo's
townhouse as well. Under the Internal Revenue Code, Henry received
notice of the lien, but Margo did not. Henry was entitled to an
administrative hearing, but Margo was not. Henry petitioned for
removal of the lien, but Margo could not. Henry could prosecute his
appeal in the United States Tax Court, but Margo could not. Why this
disparate treatment? According to the Internal Revenue Service
(Service), Henry was a "taxpayer" entitled to administrative due
process, but Margo, who hadn't incurred the debt in question, was not.
A federal tax lien can immobilize liened-upon property for over a
decade before the Service finally seizes it by levy During this time,
the property is useless for leverage-it cannot be effectively
mortgaged or sold--even if it is someone's home or an integral part of
1. See I.R.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2000) (setting the limitation period for collection by levy
at ten years after the assessment of the tax).
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someone's business.2 Because the effect of a federal tax lien can be
devastating, the latter part of the last century witnessed a congressional
effort to temper the Service's power.3 The Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act expanded statutorily created
administrative due process rights afforded to taxpayers who are the
targets of collection actions.4
In the eyes of the targeted taxpayers, the development was
welcome. For others, the expansion made no difference. Not all
collection actions target "taxpayers."5 In some cases, like Margo's, the
Service's collection efforts affect persons who hold property that,
according to the Service, is beneficially owned by a delinquent
taxpayer.' There are surprisingly few checks on the Service's seizure
of such property, and although common sense suggests a different
result, the person holding it is entitled to less due process than the
proven tax cheat whose property it is alleged to be. Remedies exist,
but they are different in both quantity and quality from those provided
to actual tax debtors. Under current practice, an entire class of
property holders, to whom we will refer as "alleged nominees," is
denied administrative due process in collection actions solely because
its members are not regarded as "taxpayers" by the Service.7
A nominee, according to the Service, is someone who receives,
but does not possess beneficial ownership of, the property of a tax
debtor.8 Consider the easy example of a corrupt real estate developer.
She has taken kickbacks from contractors, bribed city officials, and
done deals in cash. When the Service discovers her less-than-truthful
income tax reporting, can we expect her to sit idly while a revenue
officer levies on her property? It hardly seems likely. She will transfer
the property to someone else-perhaps a husband, brother, parent, or
2. A properly filed tax lien is valid against third parties like purchasers and
judgment creditors. See id § 6323(a). This means that a third party will pay less for the
property or demand the lien be paid so that clear title can be transferred. See United States v.
Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 530 (1995) (describing how purchasers of the liened-upon property
threatened suit against the seller).
3. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685; Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6227, 102
Stat. 3342, 3731 (1988).
4. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act § 3401.
5. See, e.g., I.R.S., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
§ 5.17.2.4.8.1 (2000) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL] (addressing collection from
an alter ego rather than a "taxpayer"); id § 5.17.2.4.8.2 (addressing tax collection from a
nominee rather than a "taxpayer").
6. Id. § 5.17.2.4.8.2.
7. Id. § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007).
8. Id § 5.17.2.4.8.2 (2000).
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friend. If our villain retains control of the asset, and merely transfers
its title, the unlucky (or perhaps complicit) property recipient will be
labeled a nominee and will have virtually no access to administrative
due process rights. But why should this person be entitled to due
process rights at all? After all, it is not the nominee's property that is at
stake. According to the Service, the property is beneficially owned by
the transferor, and the Service's seizure of it will not affect the
nominee's rights or hurt his bottom line.'
The foregoing argument presumes the alleged nominee's guilt-a
presumption that would be unconstitutional in other circumstances-
and its fallacy can be demonstrated by Margo and Henry's example.
Regardless of who truly owns the property for federal tax purposes,
Margo should be given effective means of challenging the Service's
lien. Because the two are similarly situated, her means of challenge
should be coextensive to that provided to Henry. Yet, under current
law, the opposite is true.'" An alleged nominee's means of recourse are
limited in comparison to those available to the actual tax debtor.'
What is more, the alleged nominee's means of recourse are equally
limited when compared to other recipients of a tax debtor's property,
such as recipients by fraudulent conveyance or corporate
reorganization.'2
It is difficult to reconcile the lack of due process provided to
alleged nominees with the abundance of protections provided to other
tax scofflaws. For procedural purposes, the two groups are
indistinguishable: both are subject to a collection action in which the
Service is cast in the role of debt collector." Both, then, should be
fully entitled to rely on existing statutory and administrative
protections against unlawful collection. Or, if the two groups are to be
treated differently, shouldn't those whose hands have been proven
unclean receive the poorer fare?
We argue that alleged nominees should be entitled to the same
modicum of protection that is afforded to taxpayers and the recipients
of fraudulently conveyed property at the lien stage of tax collection
9. See id. § 5.12.2.6.5(3) (noting that the use and benefit of the property to the
taxpayer is one of the factors that will support a finding that a third party is a nominee).
10. Id § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007).
11. Id
12. See, e.g., Al-Kim v. United States, 650 F.2d 944, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating
that nominees are not entitled to the protections afforded by I.R.C. § 6901 (2000)).
13. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supm note 5, 5.17.2.4.8.2(3) ("The Service's
NFTL [Notice of Federal Tax Lien] in a nominee situation is identical to the standard NFTL
.....)
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actions. The formal distinctions that separate these groups are
distinctions without a difference. The critical inquiry, whether the
Service may lien upon and later seize property in someone's
possession without some sort of preseizure review, has the same
import for each group. Therefore, preseizure due process rights
afforded by Congress to one group should be afforded to the others.
Conversely, if Congress denies one group such rights, it should deny
the others those rights as well.
Part II of this Article describes the genesis and scope of the
protections that are currently available to taxpayers through the
Internal Revenue Code (Code). Those persons whose debt has spurred
a tax collection action are afforded a panoply of preseizure rights. In
particular, they are entitled to participate in an administrative hearing
and appeals process that concludes with standing before the Tax
Court.'" According to the Service, the process is available only to
taxpayers, not to alleged nominees.'5 Part III, therefore, describes the
definition of taxpayer under current law and concludes that although
the Service has applied the term very narrowly, the United States
Supreme Court has construed it broadly.'6 When viewed in light of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of "taxpayer," the Service's justification
for disparate treatment of alleged nominees and tax debtors pales. 7
Part IV describes the criteria used to categorize nominees.
Although courts and the Service have iterated a multiple-factor test to
determine nominee status, the test is nearly identical to that employed
in the assessment of fraudulent conveyance.'8 Despite the strikingly
similar composition of fraudulent conveyance and nominee theories,
the recipients of a fraudulent conveyance are often entitled to the same
rights and protections as the taxpayer, while alleged nominees are not.
Part V then sets forth protections that are available to alleged nominees
and explains why those protections are ineffective in comparison to the
process provided to taxpayers and recipients of fraudulent convey-
ances. On the whole, the avenues open to alleged nominees are more
time consuming, more expensive, and require a greater production of
evidence. They are, as a result, less favorable.
14. See I.R.C. § 6320 (West Supp. 2007); id. § 6330 (West, Westlaw through 2007
amendments) (outlining collection due process).
15. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007).
16. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 534 (1995) (refusing to construe
narrowly the word taxpayer).
17. See inhia Part III.
18. SeeI.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2002-35-023, at 14-15 (June 28,2002).
[Vol. 82:781786
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Part VI describes remedies that are available to taxpayers and the
recipients of fraudulent conveyances but are not available to alleged
nominees. It argues that the Service and courts provide no rational
justification for the denial of such rights to alleged nominees.
Finally, Part VII concludes that Congress should provide
equivalent due process protection to taxpayers, recipients of fraudulent
conveyance, and alleged nominees. Each of these groups is subject to
the same manner of collection action; therefore, each realizes the
potential to be wrongfully deprived of a legitimate property interest.
The Service's policy of inconsistent treatment places a dispropor-
tionate burden on alleged nominees that is plainly and simply unfair.
Without resort to the preseizure remedies afforded other groups,
alleged nominees are forced to contend with the potentially devastating
effect of a federal tax lien in less desirable ways. As a result, the
administrative decision to file such a lien may, for practical purposes,
remain unreviewable for over a decade. 9 By affording the same rights
to alleged nominees as are afforded to other groups, Congress could
level the playing field while bringing a modicum of consistency to the
collection statutes of the Code.
II. COLLECTION DUE PROCESS BASICS
In order to understand fully the disparity in the due process
afforded to alleged nominees and that afforded to taxpayers and
recipients of fraudulently conveyed property, it is necessary to examine
the collection due process provisions and their history. Both the
contents and provenance of these provisions suggest that they should
be widely applicable to anyone affected by a collection action. The
Service, however, does not agree with this assessment."
A. Internal Revenue Service Collection Acdons: A History of
Revision
Although taxpayers are now entitled to extensive due process
protection against unfounded Service collection actions, it was not
always so. Prior to January 19, 1999, the date on which the Collection
Due Process (CDP) provisions were enacted, the Service had nearly
19. See I.R.C. § 6502(a) (2000) (giving the Service ten years after tax assessment
within which to levy the property, at which point the nominee can bring a wrongful levy
action under I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1)).
20. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supranote 5, § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007).
2008] 787
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unlimited collection discretion.2' Once the Service formally assessed a
taxpayer's deficiency, it could move forward with its collection
procedures virtually free from taxpayer interference. The taxpayer
had no right to a hearing at any point, and the Service had the power to
seize and dispose of property before the taxpayer could challenge the
validity of the assessment.23 Therefore, taxpayers were limited to
refund claims.4
Then, as now, the Service's collection action began in earnest
with the attachment of a lien. Section 6321 of the Code automatically
created a lien that arose against all of the taxpayer's property or rights
to property.25 Unlike today, there was no requirement in the Code that
the Service notify the taxpayer when a Notice of Federal Tax Lien
(NFTL) was filed against that taxpayer's property.26  Next, if the
Service wanted to seize the taxpayer's property, section 6331(d)
required that it provide the taxpayer with a notice of its intent to levy
thirty days before the levy took placeY.2  However, there were no
hearing rights attached to this requirementY.2  The Service had only to
provide the taxpayer with a single notice of intent to levy, after which it
could levy anything belonging to the taxpayer without providing
further notice.29
Due process was further circumscribed by the Anti-Injunction
Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act." These two provisions, which
barred suits and declaratory judgments restraining Service collections,
worked together to prevent taxpayers from interfering with the
collections process.3' While such unfettered discretion was seen as
21. See Marilyn E. Phelan, A Summary of the Extensive Collection Powers of the
Internal Revenue Service, 9 VA. TAX REV. 405, 432-34 & n. 108 (1990) (summarizing Service
collection powers as of 1990 and as modified by the 1988 Taxpayer Bill of Rights).
22. See id. at 465-67. Under I.R.C. § 6161, the Service could grant the taxpayer an
extension. Under I.R.C. § 6159(a), the Service could work out an installment agreement with
the taxpayer.
23. Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shillin the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 27-28
(2004).
24. See id. at 26-31.
25. I.R.C. § 6321 (2000).
26. See Phelan, supr note 21, at 436 (discussing federal tax liens).
27. I.R.C. § 6331(d)(l)-(2).
28. Id § 6331 (West Supp. 2007).
29. See id.
30. Id. § 7421 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000). For a discussion of how tax
collection and adjudication have existed outside of the constitutional mainstream, see Leslie
Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41
Hous. L. REV. 1145, 1158-88 (2004).
31. SeeBook, supranote 30, at 1153.
[Vol. 82:781
COLLECTIONDUE PROCESS
necessary lest the Service be hampered in its ability to collect from
delinquent taxpayers, it also resulted in numerous complaints and
horror stories.
32
B. Legislative History of the Collection Due Process Provisions
In a prevailing atmosphere of widespread public discontent, the
Senate Finance Committee held hearings in 1997 and 1998 to review
Service practices and to consider restructuring the Service." In his
opening remarks, Senator William V Roth, the chairperson,
underscored taxpayer concerns:
There is no doubt that the powers of the Internal Revenue Service are
extraordinary. The IRS can seize property, paychecks, and even the
residences of the people it serves. Businesses can be padlocked,
sometimes causing hundreds of employees who are also taxpayers to be
put out of work.
In some instances, the first time a taxpayer is aware of any
enforcement action by the IRS is when his or her bank calls to notify
that funds have been frozen. The IRS can take these actions in many
cases without giving the taxpayer notice or opportunity to be heard.34
In light of this and other testimony, Congress sought to place some
external checks on the Service."
The hearings were covered by the media and included testimony
from a divorced mother, 6 a priest,37 attorneys, and Service employees. 8
For example, a former Service attorney testified:
32. See Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service." Hearings Before
the S Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 1-2 (1997) (opening statement of Sen. William V
Roth, Jr.) [hereinafter Finance Comm. Hearings].
33. See Ralph Vartabedian & Jonathan Peterson, Clinton Signs Bill That Aims To
Reform IRS, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A16. The Committee held hearings on practices
and procedures of the Service on September 23-25, 1997. Finance Comm. Heaming; supra
note 32, at i. It held hearings on Service restructuring on January 28-29 and February 5, 11,
and 25, 1998. IRS Restructuring: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. i
(1998). Finally, it held hearings on Service oversight on April 28-30 and May 1, 1998. IRS
Oversight: Heaings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. i (1998). For a detailed
discussion of the hearings, see Camp, supra note 23, at 78-127. This was not the first time
that Congress sought to enhance taxpayer rights. The 1988 Taxpayer Bill of Rights added
several taxpayer-friendly provisions to the Code. Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L.
No. 100-647, § 6227, 102 Stat. 3342, 3731 (1988). The most well-known of these resulted in
the publication of "Your Rights as a Taxpayer." I.R.S. Publ'n I (rev. May 2005). The
publication provided taxpayers with an informational statement and was included in
correspondence to taxpayers. Id. at 1-2.
34. Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 32, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. William
V Roth, Jr.).
35. See id.
36. Id at 75-82 (statement of Katherine Lund Hicks).
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I knew one manager I ran across who really did not understand the
distinction between a lien and a levy and basically said, well, lien, levy,
whatever, which in some instances can cause problems.
In addition to simple lack of knowledge, I also ran across revenue
officers who understood the legal and procedural requirements, but they
chose not to follow them, or they consciously bypassed some of these
things.
39
One after the other, witnesses shared stories of Service abuse,
leaving the Service looking at best incompetent and, at worst,
malicious. ' Most of the allegations of widespread abuse were later
shown to be false," but the testimony nonetheless made an impact.2
An agency of the U.S. Government allowed such sweeping authority as that
granted to the IRS should be held to the highest standards of honesty and integrity.
The IRS is not. Those of us subject to that authority should be guaranteed an
accessible and effective remedy for its abuse. We are not. It is a disgrace to our
Nation that an arm of our democratic government is allowed to behave as if it were
an extension of a police state.
Id at 82.
37. Id. at 85-86 (statement of Monsignor Lawrence Ballweg).
For 8 months I lived in constant worry, if not fear, that the trust that my dear
mother had established to help the poor would be penalized because of what I can
only call the unprofessional, calloused, and indifferent behavior of IRS employees
who are devious enough never to sign their names to any notice that they send out.
The taxpayer is dealing with people who can do inestimable harm, and cannot even
be identified.
Id. at 86.
38. Id at 116-20 (statement of Lawrence G. Lilly); id at 142-94 (statements of
Witnesses Nos. 1-6).
As of late, we seem to be auditing only poor people. The current IRS
management does not believe anyone in this country can possibly live on less than
$20,000 per year, insisting anyone below that level must be cheating by under-
stating their true income.
Currently, in a typical case assigned for audit there are no assets, no signs of
wealth, no evidence that would support a suspicion of higher unreported income.
So when the IRS does initiate and [sic] audit on these people, these individuals are
already only one short step away from being on the street.
Id. at 121 (statement of Jennifer Long).
39. Id. at 109 (statement of Darren Larsen).
40. See id at 23-32, 35-139, 142-253 (reporting testimony and statements at the
Senate Committee on Finance Hearings by twenty-one public witnesses about their
experiences with the Service as taxpayers or employees).
41. See Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/OSI-99-9R (1999), reprinted in TAX NOTES
TODAY 80-13 (Apr. 25, 2000). The General Accounting Office Report concluded that a
taxpayer abuse allegations could not be substantiated. Id.
42. For a discussion of the problems with the use of such anecdotal evidence, see
Leandra Lederman, Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy, 87 TAX NOTEs
1133, 1135-36 (2000).
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After the hearings, the acting Commissioner, Michael Dolan,
apologized to taxpayers, saying that the hearings were "very painful." 3
As a result of the hearings, the Senate Finance Committee
adopted a CDP proposal that was unprecedented in its scope." It
would have required the Service, prior to filing an NFTL, to provide
the taxpayer with thirty days to request a hearing.45 At the hearing, the
taxpayer would have been able to challenge the tax liability on any
grounds." If unsuccessful, the taxpayer would have then had a right to
appeal to the Tax Court, and ultimately the Court of Appeals." During
this time, the Service would have been required to suspend its
collection actions.
President Clinton's administration opposed the proposed CDP
provisions:
The proposed process would permit the non-compliant taxpayer to
benefit at the expense of the vast majority of taxpayers who report and
pay their taxes timely. In essence, this legislation would give any
taxpayer a unilateral right to enjoin collection of taxes simply by taking
an appeal to the Office of Appeals and then to the Tax Court .... [The
protections] might dramatically affect the ability of the IRS to collect
taxes .... 49
Congress accordingly amended and passed the CDP proposal, and
President Clinton signed the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA) on July 22.5" The RRA reorganized
the Service and targeted abuses that had come to light during the
hearings.5
43. Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Tightens Its Procedures for Seizing Property, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 3, 1997, at A18. He also said, "It distresses me a great deal to see the mistakes we
have made and their impact." Id.
44. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 67-68 (1998).
45. Id. at 68. There were jeopardy procedures the Service could utilize if it believed
that notice would undermine its collection efforts. Id. at 69.
46. Id. at 68.
47. Id. at 68-69.
48. Id.
49. Letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Justice Dep't, to
The Honorable William V Roth, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on Fin., U.S. Senate, and The
Honorable Bill Archer, Chairman, Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Representatives
20-21 (June 8, 1998), reprinted in L. Anthony Sutin, Justice Letter Raising Constitutional
Concerns in IRS Reform, TAX NEWSTODAY 112-41 (June 11, 1998).
50. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685; see Vartabedian & Peterson, supra note 33
("'The bill will give the American people an IRS they deserve,' said Clinton, who originally
was skeptical about the proposals but became a convert following sensational Senate hearings
on IRS misdeeds.").
51. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act § 1001 (a), 112 Stat.
at 689 (codified at I.R.C. § 7801 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
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C Descdption of the Taxpayer Protections Provided
RRA section 3401 added sections 6320 and 6330 to the Code.52
These CDP provisions provide taxpayers with hearing rights with
regard to liens and levies, respectively." While the CDP provisions, as
enacted, do not afford the taxpayer with as many rights as the
Committee proposal did, they nonetheless allow the taxpayer to
administratively dispute Service collections, a luxury not afforded to
alleged nominees."
1. Section 6320
Section 6320 of the Code governs the lien stage of collection
actions." It requires the Service to provide written notification to the
taxpayer not more than five business days after filing an NFTL.5 The
notice must inform the taxpayer of the right to request an
administrative hearing." It must be given in person, left at the
taxpayer's dwelling or usual place of business, or sent by certified or
registered mail to the taxpayer's last known address. If the notice is
not properly sent, the thirty-day period does not begin, and the
taxpayer must be given another notice. The Service will only give
notice to the delinquent taxpayer and not to any person holding
property of the taxpayer, such as an alleged nominee.' ° The notice
must include the amount of unpaid tax, the taxpayer's right to a
hearing, the administrative appeals available, and the statutory
52. Id. § 3401, 112 Stat. at 746 (codified at I.R.C. § 6320 (West Supp. 2007); id.
§ 6330 (West, Westlaw through 2007 amendments)).
53. Id. For a detailed analysis of the CDP provisions, see Leslie Book, The New
Collection Due Process Taxpayer Rights; 86 TAx NoTEs 1127, 1135-52 (2000).
54. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, § 3401, 112 Stat. at
746. For discussion and critique of the CDP provisions, see Danshera Cords, How Much
Process Is Due? 1R. C Sections 6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process Heatings, 29 VT. L.
REv. 51, 59-98 (2004).
55. I.R.C. § 6320 (West Supp. 2007).
56. Id. § 6320(a)(1)(2) (2000). "In practice, this notification is given by Letter
3172-Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing under I.R.C. § 6320."
Collection Due Process Cases, I.R.S. Notice CC-2006-019, at 8 (Aug. 18, 2006).
57. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(3)(B).
58. Id. § 6320(a)(2).
59. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1 (a)(2), Q&A-A12 (as amended in 2007). However
actual receipt is not a prerequisite to the validity of the CDP notice. See id.
60. Seeid § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A1.
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provisions and procedures relating to the release of liens on
properties."
The CDP hearing is held by the Internal Revenue Office of
Appeals (Appeals Office) by an impartial officer who has had no prior
involvement with the matter." The taxpayer is allowed one hearing per
tax period." Whenever possible, this hearing is consolidated with the
section 6330 hearing, which is described below." There is no
requirement that the hearing be face-to-face, but generally,
nonfrivolous requests for face-to-face hearings are granted.6 ' The
hearings are held at the Appeals Office closest to the taxpayer's
residence. ' They are informal, and the hearing procedures required by
the Administrative Procedure Act do not apply.7
At the hearing, the taxpayer may raise any issue relating to the
unpaid tax, including spousal defenses, challenges to filing of the
NFTL, and offers for collection alternatives.68 However, the taxpayer
can only raise challenges to the existence or the amount of the tax
liability if the taxpayer did not receive a notice of deficiency for the
underlying tax or never had an opportunity to dispute the tax liability. 9
The taxpayer is expected to provide all relevant information requested
by the Appeals Office for its consideration of the issues at the
hearing. °
After the hearing, the Appeals Office is required to issue a Notice
of Determination.' The taxpayer may appeal the determination to the
Tax Court within thirty days after this notice is issued." However, the
61. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(3). In practice, the Service provides the taxpayer with Form
12153-Request for a Due Process Hearing. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A9.
However, taxpayers are not required to use this form. See id.
62. I.R.C. § 6320(b) (West. Supp. 2007). For an overview of the CDP hearing, see
David B. Robison, The Collection Due Process Hearing-An Insider Perspective, 104 J.
TAx'N 225, 225-28 (2006).
63. I.R.C. § 6320(b)(2) (2000).
64. Id. § 6320(b)(3)-(4).
65. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A-D7.
66. Id
67. Id. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A-D6; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557 (2000).
68. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(e)(1). Offers for collection alternatives include an offer
in compromise, the posting of a bond, substitution of other assets, and a subordination of the
NFTL. Id. § 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E6.
69. Id. § 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2. This means a receipt in time to petition the
Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Id. This is more restrictive than the Senate
Finance Committee proposal, which would have allowed the taxpayer to dispute the
underlying liability on any grounds. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 68 (1998).
70. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(e)(1).
71. Id. § 301.6320-1(0(1).
72. Id
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taxpayer may only ask the Tax Court to consider issues that were
properly raised at the CDP hearing.73
2. Section 6330
Under section 6330 of the Code, the Service is required to
provide written notification of its intent to levy any property or right to
property of any person prior to the levy." In general, the provisions in
section 6330 mirror those in section 6320. The content of the notice
and the method for its delivery are similar to that described in section
6320." In addition, the notice must detail the action proposed by the
Service, including provisions and procedures relating to the levy and
sale of property, the availability of administrative appeals, a description
of alternatives that could prevent the levy, and provisions and
procedures regarding the redemption of property and the release of
liens on the property.76
In addition, section 6330 provides a list of factors that the
Appeals Office will consider when determining the propriety of a
levy." These include whether the Service met the requirements of
applicable law or administrative procedures, any issues appropriately
raised by the taxpayer, spousal defenses, challenges to the proposed
collection, any offers for collection alternatives, and whether the
collection action sufficiently balances the need for efficient collection
and the concern that any collection action be no more intrusive than
necessary."
During the hearing and appeals period, levy actions are usually
suspended. 9 However, the Tax Court may permit the levy action if the
underlying tax liability is not at issue and the Service shows good
cause not to suspend."0 Finally, if the taxpayer does not prevail in the
section 6330 appeals process, he can file a petition for Tax Court
review.
8'
73. Id § 301.6320-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3.
74. I.R.C. § 6330(a)(1) (2000). Except for jeopardy levies or levies on state income,
tax refunds are excepted from the requirements in section 6330. Id. § 6330(f) (West Supp.
2007).
75. Id. § 6330(a)(2)-(3) (2000).
76. Id. § 6330(a)(3)(C).
77. Id. § 6330(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-El (as amended in 2007) (listing
factors to be considered).
79. I.R.C. § 6330(e)(1) (2000).
80. Id § 6330(e)(2).
81. Id § 6330(d)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
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III. COLLECTION DuE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AGAINST LIENS ARE
ONLY AVAILABLE TO THE "TAXPAYER"
Despite their beneficent purpose and sweeping scope, sections
6320 and 6330 are not available to all persons affected by a collection
action." Section 6320 applies only to "the person described in section
6321 ,,83 whom the regulations refer to as "the taxpayer."' ' Section
6321, in turn, applies to "any person liable to pay any tax [who]
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand."85 Section 6330 is
textually broader-it applies to "any person" whose property the
Service intends to levy upon-but the regulations specify that it
applies only to a person described in section 6331.86 This person, too,
is described by the regulations as "the taxpayer." 7 The regulations also
specify that neither section 6320 nor section 6330 is applicable to
alleged nominees because alleged nominees are not taxpayers.
Furthermore, other CDP sections, such as one that permits the Service
to withdraw a lien in some circumstances, apply only to the
"taxpayer."89  Accordingly, when a person who is the subject of a
Service collection action is not also liable for the underlying tax debt,
the panoply of ordinarily available administrative and judicial remedies
is severely limited. The scope of who may be considered a taxpayer is
thus a critical inquiry.
In its natural environment, the definition of taxpayer is
amorphous and can change according to the dictates of law or equity."
When used in the Code, and "where not otherwise distinctly expressed
or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof," the word
82. SeeTreas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7; id. § 301.6330-1(a)(3), Q&A-A2.
83. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(1); see also id. § 632 1(a)(1) (designating the individual to whom
section 6320 will apply).
84. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-AI.
85. I.R.C. § 6321.
86. Id. § 6330 (West, Westlaw through 2007 amendments); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-
l(a)(3), Q&A-A1.
87. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(a)(3), Q&A-A1.
88. See id. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7; id. § 301.6330-1(a)(3), Q&A-A2. In a
question and answer format, the section 6320 regulation states, "Will the IRS give
notification to a known nominee of, or a person holding property of, the taxpayer ... ?" Id.
§ 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7. The answer is, "No. Such person is not the person described
in section 6321 and, therefore, is not entitled to notice...... Id The section 6330 regulation
is nearly identical. See id. § 301.633001(a)(3), Q&A-A2.
89. I.R.C. § 6323(j) (2000).
90. Compare id. § 7701(a)(14) (defining a taxpayer as a person who is subject to an
internal revenue tax) with Treas. Reg. § 301.6320(a)(2), Q&A-A7 (stating that section 6321
does not describe nominees).
7952008]
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"'taxpayer' means any person subject to any internal revenue tax."9'
This definition, if interpreted literally, is all-encompassing and should,
in theory, extend the spirit of collection due process to a person who
pays any tax, whether or not the tax at issue. As discussed below, the
Service has taken a contrary position in specific instances, and other
definitions of the word may be inferred from the context of the Code
and from case law in specific instances." The distinction is important
because, throughout the Regulations, a "taxpayer" or "the person"
liable for a tax can protect her rights during collection, whereas a
person not considered to be a taxpayer may be denied the same
opportunity.93
The Service, for purposes of the CDP provisions, considers the
"taxpayer" to be "the person" "liable to pay any tax" and who
"neglects or refuses to pay" the tax on demand.94 Such a person is
entitled to collection due process rights.95 Conversely, the Service
views nominees, who are not liable for the underlying debt asserted
against them, as a class of individuals not afforded collection due
process rights. 6 The Service's narrow construction is unwarranted.
Although the word taxpayer is traditionally thought of as the person
who owes a tax or the person against whom a tax is assessed, its
definition has been expanded through judicial interpretation. Aside
from the person who owes a particular tax, a taxpayer may also be,
among other things, a person who pays a tax liability of another, a
transferee under section 6901, or particular individuals within a
partnership or corporation.98 The following describes instances in
which a "taxpayer" or a "person" has been more than what meets the
eye.
91. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(14).
92. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A2 ("The person described in
section 6321 is the person liable to pay the tax due after notice and demand who refuses or
neglects to pay the tax due (hereinafter, referred to as the taxpayer)." (emphasis added)).
93. See, e.g., id § 301.6320-1(b)(2), Q&A-B5 (describing that only the section 6321
taxpayer is entitled to a CDP hearing and that while a nominee may be entitled to another
type of administrative hearing, resulting decisions would not be subject to judicial review).
94. See I.R.C. § 6320 (West Supp. 2007); id § 6321 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-
I(a)(2), Q&A-A1. Conversely, the regulations provide that a nominee "is not the person
described in section 6321." Id. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7.
95. I.R.C. § 6320 (West Supp. 2007); id § 6330 (West, Westlaw through 2007
amendments).
96. SeeTreas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7; id. § 301.6330-1(a)(3), Q&A-A2.
97. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 535 (1995) (rejecting the govern-
ment's interpretation of the definition of taxpayeras excluding those against whom no tax has
been assessed).
98. See id.; Rev. Proc. 2005-34, 2005-1 C.B. 1233-35.
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A. Revenue Procedure 2005-34
Revenue Procedure 2005-34 highlights the interplay between
Congress's use of "person" and its use of "taxpayer."'99 The Revenue
Procedure describes administrative appeals of proposed trust fund
recovery penalty assessments.'°°  As it notes, section 6672(a) imposes a
penalty on "any person" required to collect the underlying tax who
willfully fails to do so.'"' For purposes of the relevant Code chapter, a
"person" is defined as "an officer or employee of a corporation, or a
member or employee of a partnership, who ... is under a duty to
perform" the obligation of the organization.' 2 As is generally the case
with penalties imposed by the Code, section 6672 requires the Service
to give notice to the affected party. 3 Section 6672's notice provision,
however, does not apply specifically to the statutory "person "' "
Rather, it applies to "any taxpayer" against whom the Service intends
to assess the penalty.' 5 The Revenue Procedure supposes that this
discrepancy in language exists because the penalty may ultimately be
asserted against people who, ironically, are not "persons" under the
statute.06
Revenue Procedure 2005-34 provides the beginning of a
framework in which to consider the use of the words person and
taxpayer in the collections arena.' 7 For purposes of section 6672, the
Service has taken the position that people against whom it intends to
assess a penalty, but who ultimately may not be subject to the penalty
because they are not "persons," should be afforded notice despite their
questionable personhood.'0 In other words, the Service views the
potential application of section 6672 as sufficient to justify the
provision of some small measure of due process notice. 9  By
espousing this interpretation of the statute, the Service has said, in not
so many words, that a "taxpayer" can be someone who is not liable for
the particular tax at issue, a position that is the polar opposite of its
stance on CDP matters.
99. Rev. Proc. 2005-34, supra note 98, at 1234.
100. Id
101. Id
102. I.R.C. § 6671(b) (2000).
103. Id § 6672(b).
104. Rev. Proc. 2005-34, supra note 98, at 1233-35.
105. Id. at 1234 (citing I.R.C. § 6672(b)).
106. Id
107. Id. at 1233-35.
108. Seeid. at 1234.
109. Seeid
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B. Views of the Supreme Court
Like the Service, courts have given various interpretations to the
word taxpayer."' There are instances where an individual seeks to be
considered a taxpayer and is denied that label, or in the alternative,
where a person seeks not to be considered a taxpayer owing a
particular tax."' For example, those requesting due process may seek
to be classified as taxpayers while those attempting to avoid liability
altogether may try to shun the label. For alleged nominees, who are in
the former category, the most important court case to date has been the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v Williams.
1. The Williams Decision
The Williams decision held that a plaintiff who paid the taxes of
another could file a suit for refund because she was, quite literally, a
taxpayer. '  Although common sense recommends such a holding,
prior to Williams, the Service denied the ability of a third party to file
such a claim on the premise that the third party had not made an
overpayment of his or her own taxes."' Under section 6402(a) of the
Code, the Service may only issue a refund "[i]n the case of any
overpayment.""' Like a host of other terms used in the collections
statutes, "overpayment" is not clearly defined by the Code."5 Section
6511, however, specifies that the relevant statute of limitations applies
to "an overpayment of any tax" for which "the taxpayer is required to
file a return.""' 6 Before the Court's decision in Williams, the Service
took the position that an alleged nominee who paid someone else's
liability was not a taxpayer claiming a refund of tax for which she was
110. Compare United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 535 (1995) (holding that the
definition of taxpayer included the plaintiff who had paid the tax liability of another person),
with United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 120-21 (2004) (holding that although partners
could be considered taxpayers, they were not the relevant taxpayers because the employment
taxes were assessed against the partnership).
111. See Busse v. United States, 542 F2d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
United States had not waived sovereign immunity to suits by nontaxpayers with the
implication that the plaintiff, whose claim was dismissed, was not a taxpayer).
112. 514 U.S. at 535-36.
113. See Snodgrass v. United States, 834 E2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1987), abrogated by
United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) "permits
only the taxpayer who has paid a tax" to sue the United States for a refund); Busse, 542 F2d
at 425 (holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to a refund suit by a
plaintiff who paid the tax of another).
114. I.R.C. § 6402(a)(2000).
115. See DAVID M. RICHARDSON ET AL., CMIL TAX PROCEDURE 219 (2005) ("Neither
the Code nor the Regulations contains a comprehensive definition of an overpayment.").
116. I.R.C. § 6511(a).
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required to file a return.' 7 Accordingly, under section 6511(a), an
alleged nominee could not file a claim for a refund or file a subsequent
refund suit.
Circuit courts disagreed about the appropriate result, and some
sided with the Service."8 For instance, in 1976, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of a
third party's refund suit regarding transferee liability on the ground that
the petitioner was not "the taxpayer" entitled to sue for a refund."' The
court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1),'2° which gives district
courts original jurisdiction over any civil action against the United
States for recovery of internal revenue tax, is a waiver of sovereign
immunity that must be construed narrowly; therefore, it did not waive
sovereign immunity with respect to suits by "non-taxpayers.'1'2 The
court further held that the existence of other remedies-a suit to quiet
title under 28 U.S.C. § 2410 and a wrongful levy action under section
7426-provided additional evidence that refund suit jurisdiction was
inappropriate for a third-party payor.'
2
In 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed a similar situation in Snodgrass v United States.'23  It
affirmed the dismissal of a refund suit by the wife of a taxpayer even
though the Service collected her portion of proceeds from the sale of
community property in satisfaction of a penalty assessed against her
husband.' Like the Seventh Circuit, the court focused on a narrow
construction of the waiver of sovereign immunity and held that only a
"taxpayer" may bring a refund suit.'25 Because Mrs. Snodgrass was not
117. See Snodgrass, 834 F.2d at 539-40.
118. See Busse, 542 E2d at 424 (discussing the "conflict in the authorities on the
question of whether a refund suit can be filed by a person who pays a third party's taxes").
119. Jdat425.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
United States Court of Federal Claims, of
(1) any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.
121. Busse, 542 F.2d at 425.
122. Id
123. 834 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1987).
124. Id. at 538.
125. Id. at539-40. The court added:
We recognize that inequity may result from our dismissing this action and
consigning the Snodgrasses to another remedy against the government, or perhaps
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the "taxpayer," the court held that she had no standing to bring a refund
action.'26 The Fifth Circuit added, "We have recently noted that th[e]'wrongful levy' provision is now the only means by which third parties
may challenge the tax-collection activities of the IRS."'2
7
A more recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion.18 In 1990,
Martin v United States held that any person against whom a tax is
erroneously assessed or collected has standing to bring a refund
action. 9 In Martin, the Service assessed taxes against a husband and
then filed a tax lien against him.'30 In a divorce settlement, the wife
received title to a residence, which she later sold."' The Service
erroneously asserted the husband's tax lien upon sale of the property,
and the wife's attorney paid the required amount on her behalf so that
she could convey clear title. 3 Although the Service admitted that the
lien had not properly attached to the wife's interest, it refused to grant a
refund to her, arguing that it had no authority to give a refund to a
third-party payor.' 3 The Fourth Circuit applied a plain meaning
interpretation of § 1346(a)(1) and held that anyperson from whom a
tax is erroneously assessed or collected has standing to bring a refund
action.'34
When presented with the Williams case, the Supreme Court
agreed with the Fourth Circuit.' 5 With Williams, the Court expanded
the boundary of "taxpayer" in tantalizing ways. 1 6 Based on the factsdescribed below, the Court was called upon to determine whether Ms.
no remedy at all. However, as the Second Circuit has summed up, "[T]he spirit
proper to judicial consideration of a waiver of sovereign immunity is not one of
generosity and broad interpretation." Democratic sovereigns, like kings, may do
wrongs, but in the absence of their consent, the courts of their nations lack
jurisdiction to remedy the harms they have wrought.
Id. at 540 (quoting Phillips v. United States, 346 E2d 999, 1000 (2d Cir. 1965)).
126. Id. at 539.
127. Id. (citing Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 E2d 299, 307 n.12
(5th Cir. 1985)).
128. Martin v. United States, 895 E2d 992,994 (4th Cir. 1990).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 992.
131. Id
132. Id. at 992-93.
133. Id. at 993.
134. Id. at 994.




Williams was authorized to sue for a refund under 28 U.S.C. § 1346.' 37
The Court held that she was.1
38
Ms. Williams was given a house and other property by her
husband, Mr. Rabin, in anticipation of divorce, and as consideration for
the transfers, she assumed three of his liabilities totaling almost
$650,000.13 Ms. Williams took title to the house and other property
without notice of any tax liens against it.'14 Ms. Williams later entered
into a contract to sell the house, and one week prior to the closing, the
Service gave her actual notice of a tax lien against it arising from
liabilities of her husband."' The Service asserted that the liens had
attached to the husband's interest in the house prior to its transfer.'
4 2
Under threat of suit by the buyer and under protest to the Service, Ms.
Williams paid $41,937 to have the liens removed so she could convey
clear title. 
43
Ms. Williams filed an administrative claim for refund that was
subsequently denied, and then she filed suit in the district court.'" The
Service argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Ms.
Williams' claim because "she lacked standing to seek a refund under
§ 1346(a)(1)," which the Service felt only permitted actions by the
"assessed party.""'4 The crux of the Service's argument was that under
section 7422 of the Code, Ms. Williams could not bring a refund
action without first exhausting her administrative remedies, that under
section 6511, only a "taxpayer" can exhaust, and that under section
7701 (a)(14), Ms. Williams was not a taxpayer.
14 6
The Court looked at the language and history of § 1346(a)(1) and
noted that it was similar to the common law assumpsit actions
formerly brought against tax collectors. 4 1 It observed that
"[a]ssumpsit afforded a remedy to those who, like Williams, had paid
money they did not owe-typically as a result of fraud, duress, or
mistake.' 4'8 The Court therefore felt that the Service's limitation of
137. Id. at 531.
138. Id






145. Id at 530-31.
146. Id. at 532-33.
147. Id. at 532.
148. Id.
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relief was inconsistent with the statute.' 9 The Court also reasoned that
the statute authorized refunds to parties other than the one assessed.'5°
It found that the section 7701(a)(14) definition of taxpayer was broad
enough to encompass Ms. Williams and that the word "'taxpayer' ...
cannot bear the weight the [Service] puts on it."' 5 ' It noted that by
placing a lien on Williams's home and by "accepting her tax payment
under protest, the [Service] surely subjected Williams to a tax, even
though she was not the assessed party."'52 The Court concluded, "The
[Service]'s strained reading of § 1346(a)(1), we note, would leave
people in Williams' position without a remedy.""'
Subsequent court decisions have not wholeheartedly adopted the
Supreme Court's broad use of "taxpayer," and some courts have
limited Williams to the narrow situation in which a taxpayer has paid
under protest the tax underlying the lien.' 4 Nonetheless, the Williams
case leaves open the possibility that placement of a tax lien on property
not belonging to the tax debtor could, in some instances, be a sufficient
deprivation of rights to constitute taxation for purposes of the section
7701(a)(14) definition of "taxpayer" and for purposes of the section
6321 lien provision that triggers access to the collections due process
protections contained in section 6320.
2. United States v Galletti
In United States v Galetti, the Court once again tackled the
section 7701(a)(14) definition of taxpayer.'5 The question presented-
whether the Service was required to assess unpaid employment taxes
against both a partnership and the individual partners under sections
6501(a) and 6502(a)-depended upon whether the partners were
relevant "taxpayers.'"156
The facts of the case were as follows. The Service properly
assessed a tax liability against the Marina Cabrillo Company for
failure to pay federal employment taxes, but the debt was never
149. Id.
150. Id. at 534.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 535.
153. Id. at 536.
154. See, e.g., Dahn v. United States, 127 F3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that where the target of a collection action makes no effort to pay but is merely a
passive participant, Williams does not apply).
155. 541 U.S. 114, 118(2004).
156. Id at 116.
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satisfied. '57 The general partners, the Gallettis and Briguglios, later
filed for bankruptcy, and the Service filed a proof of claim seeking the
unpaid employment taxes of the partnership. '58
The partners argued that the assessment against the partnership
was ineffective against the partners themselves. "9 The Service did not
assess the partners within the three-year period described in the statute
of limitations; therefore, the partners maintained that the Service could
no longer collect against them.'6 The partners argued that they should
have been named in the assessment because "they are 'the [relevant]
taxpayer[s]' under § 6203 and because they are jointly and severally
liable for the tax debts of the Partnership.'
6'
The Court disagreed with the partners' position.'62 It determined
that section 6501(a) merely requires "that [a tax] is assessed, not the
taxpayer."' 63 Accordingly, the Court held that once the tax is assessed
against the correct taxpayer, the statute does not obligate the Service to
reassess individuals or entities that would ultimately be liable for the
tax under state law." It added that if the question of taxpayer identity
were relevant to the outcome of the case, it mattered little to the
result.'65 The partnership was the primary obligor of the tax debt.'66
Even though the partners would ultimately pay the tax, their liability
was a function of state entity law, not of the Code.'67 Looking to
Williams, the Court explained that it was required to interpret
'taxpayer'. . . with reference to the underlying liability."'68 Therefore,
the partners were not taxpayers with regard to the employment tax,
which federal law imposed solely on the partnership. 9
At first blush, Galletti seems to cut against affording due process
rights to alleged nominees because the "underlying liability" upon
which a nominee lien is premised is not that of the nominee.'7 ° This
157. Id. at 117.
158. Id
159. Id.
160. Id at 117-18.
161. Id. at 119-20 (alteration in original).
162. Id. at 120-21.





168. Id at 121 n.3.
169. Seeidat 121.
170. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.2.4.8.2(1) (defining a nominee
lien as one that "extends to property 'actually' owned by the taxpayer even though a third
party holds 'legal' title to the property as nominee").
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interpretation is too narrow. The Supreme Court's distinction between
the liability of the Galletti partners and that of their partnership was
one of source."' The source of the partnership's debt was a provision
of the Code, but the source of the partners' debts was a provision of
California state law.'72  In other words, the Supreme Court's
consideration of the underlying liability merely amounted to a
determination of whether the debt in question was imposed upon the
partners by federal law.'73 In Galletti California law provided that
general partners were liable for the debts of their partnership. 4 No
similar provision exists in the nominee context.
The Supreme Court addressed the interaction of federal and state
law in nominee collection actions in Drye v United States.' In that
case, the plaintiff was a tax debtor who inherited and then disclaimed
his mother's estate.' As a result of the disclaimer, the estate passed to
the plaintiff's daughter, who transferred the property to a family trust
of which the plaintiff was a beneficiary.' The Service recorded a
nominee lien against the trust and levied against accounts held in the
trust's name.7 8  The plaintiff argued that the Service's levy was
wrongful because, under state law, he was not the owner of the
property held by the trust. 9 Conversely, the Service argued that
federal law governed its ability to levy property.'8 In a decision that
split the proverbial baby, the Court held: "We look initially to state law
to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the [Service]
seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's
state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property'
within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation."' 8'
In light of Drye, Galletti should not prevent a court from
concluding, under Williams, that a nominee may be entitled to a
taxpayer's due process rights under the Code. Although Drye
delineates a role for state law in nominee collection proceedings, that
role is merely to determine the alleged nominee's rights in property."2
171. Galletb 541 U.S. at 121.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 123.
174. Id.
175. 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999).
176. Id. at 53.
177. Id. at 53-54. An interesting trick, to be sure.
178. Id. at 54.
179. Id at 57.
180. Id.




In contrast, the state law at issue in Gallettiactually imposed liability.'83
Whereas the source of the liability in Galletti was a state law, which
prevented the partners from being federal taxpayers, the source of
liability in nominee lien cases is wholly federal."" Consequently,
Galletni should not prevent the provision of due process to alleged
nominees under sections 6320 and 6330. Nor should it prevent them
from being classified as "taxpayers" for purposes of those sections in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Williams.
The Williams case's interpretation of the word taxpayer could be
read broadly to encompass alleged nominees.' Although Williams
dealt not with a lien, but with the seizure of property by levy, a lien is
also a form of seizure. Liened-upon property cannot be effectively
mortgaged or alienated.'86 Therefore, the existence of a lien makes
improvement of the property impractical. Furthermore, a lien is
merely the prelude to a complete deprivation.' 7 An alleged nominee,
then, like a delinquent taxpayer, has not yet paid, but is expected to pay
taxes.'8 Under the Williams formulation, an alleged nominee who was
innocent would unquestionably become a taxpayer when his or her
property was levied.' 9 The result should be the same at the lien stage.
While a lien is in place, the tax debtor and the alleged nominee both
suffer deprivation as a result of the Service's use of their property as a
surety. If the deprivation suffered by the alleged nominee as a result of
the lien is the same as that suffered by the tax debtor, it follows under
the reasoning employed by Williams that the alleged nominee is no
less a taxpayer than the tax debtor.
183. United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 121 (2004).
184. Id.; Drye, 528 U.S. at 57 ("[T]he Code and ... case law place under federal, not
state, control the ultimate issue whether a taxpayer has a beneficial interest in any property
subject to levy .... ").
185. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 540 (1995) (holding that a person
can sue the Service for a refund where she paid a tax erroneously levied against her property).
186. A lien acts as an encumbrance on the property. See Guidelines for Notices of
Federal Tax Liens and CentrlizedLien Processing, I.R.S. Publ'n 1468 (Aug. 2006) (defining
a federal tax lien as a claim against the property of the taxpayer, which may later be
enforced); Jack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 153, 191 (1995) (stating that a federal tax lien encumbers the property of a taxpayer).
An encumbrance may make property difficult to sell. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 568
(8th ed. 2004) (defining an encumbrance as "[a] claim or liability that is attached to property
... and that may lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage").
187. See I.R.C. § 633 l(a)-(b) (2000) (authorizing the Service to levy any property on
which a lien has been placed, and defining levy as the "seizure by any means" of the
taxpayer's property).
188. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.2.4.8.2(1).
189. See Williams, 514 U.S. at 535.
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IV NOMINEE BASICS
A. Who Is a Nominee?
Despite Williams broad definition of taxpayer, the Service
continues to differentiate taxpayers from alleged nominees.' ° The two
groups are entitled to different sets of rights: taxpayers receive a full
set of rights and nominees receive almost none."9' This raises an
important question: who is a nominee?
A court faced with an alleged nominee "attempts to discern
whether a taxpayer has engaged in a sort of legal fiction, for federal tax
purposes, by placing legal title to property in the hands of another
while, in actuality, retaining all or some of the benefits of being the
true owner."'92  The Code makes no mention of nominee liens or
nominee theory, and the Treasury Regulations advert to the idea only
briefly.'93 A second group of transferees, referred to as "alter egos,"
face the same dilemma.'94 An alter ego is generally an entity that is
separate in form but a mere extension of the taxpayer in substance.9
The nominee and alter ego concepts are closely related, and courts are
often asked to address both in a single case.'96 For simplicity, we will
refer to alleged nominees for the remainder of the Article, but it is
worth noting that alleged alter egos face the same set of challenges.9
The Internal Revenue Manual (Manual), which is not binding
authority, is the main source of Service guidance on when and how it
pursues a nominee lien.'98 Unfortunately, its description of nominee
liens is sparse, vague, and seemingly contradictory.'99 Although it lists
general definitions and factors for agents to consider, the Manuallacks
190. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.5329-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7 (as amended in 2007) (stating
that a nominee of the delinquent taxpayer will not receive notice of the filing of an NFTL).
191. See supra Part Ill.
192. Richards v. United States (In re Richards), 231 B.R. 571, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
193. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(a)(3), Q&A-A7, Q&A-B5; id. § 301.6330-1(a),
Q&A-A2, Q&A-B5.
194. SeeUnited States v. Scherping, 187 E3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1999).
195. See id
196. See, e.g., Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 E3d 280, 283-84 (5th Cir.
2000) (addressing a levy imposed upon Oxford as both nominee and alter ego).
197. In fact, alleged alter egos are in a worse position. Nominees lose only the
specific property at issue. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.2.4.8.2(4). In
contrast, all of the alter ego's assets are exposed because the alter ego is viewed merely as an
extension of the taxpayer. Id. § 5.17.2.4.8.1(1).
198. See Oxford 211 F3d at 285-86 (noting that the Service's failure to follow
nominee lien procedures in the Manualwas not fatal to its collection action).
199. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supm note 5, § 5.17.2.4.8.2.
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detail on the procedural process used to make a determination."° It
defines nominee as an "individual who holds legal title to property of a
taxpayer while the taxpayer enjoys full use and benefit of that
property."2 ' In other words, the federal tax lien extends to property
"'actually' owned by the taxpayer even though a third party holds
"'legal' title to the property as nominee. °2
Although the definition sounds as though it would be easy to
apply, it requires a facts and circumstances analysis. 3 There is not one
determinative factor. The Service itself, in varying sources, has more
than one nonexhaustive, nonexclusive list of factors to consider when
determining if a person is a nominee of the targeted taxpayer.2" The
Manuallists these factors:
a. The taxpayer previously owned the property.
b. The nominee paid little or no consideration for the property.
c. The taxpayer retains possession or control of the property.
d. The taxpayer continues to use and enjoy the property conveyed
just as the taxpayer had before such conveyance.
e. The taxpayer pays all or most of expenses of the property.
201f. The conveyance was for tax avoidance purposes.
An IRS Litigation GidanceMemorandum lists additional factors such
as whether there was a close relationship between the taxpayer and the
nominee and whether the parties failed to record the conveyance.26
The Manual goes on to say that the factors used to determine
whether a nominee situation exists are usually identical to those used
to determine whether a taxpayer has conveyed property fraudulently
with the purpose of keeping it from creditors. 7 But another section of
the Manual instructs that while they have similar characteristics, a
fraudulent conveyance should be distinguished from a nominee
situation .2 " There are five determining factors listed, but they are less
than robust. 9 Their essence is that fraudulent conveyances are
intended to effect an actual transfer of property (or an interest in
property) while transfer to a "nominee" is merely a "simulated
200. Id
201. Id. § 5.17.2.4.8.2(i).
202. Id.
203. Ad The Manuallays out a suggested list of factors to consider when determining
whether a property holder is a nominee. Id. § 5.17.2.4.8.2(2).
204. See id.; I.R.S. Litig. Guidance Mem. GL-21 (Oct. 31, 1989).
205. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.2.4.8.2(2).
206. I.R.S. Litig. Guidance Mem. GL-2 1, supra note 204.
207. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.2.4.8.2.
208. Id. § 5.17.14.2.4(2).
209. See id
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transfer" that is not intended to divest the transferor of any rights to the
property."'  "An example of a nominee situation'" according to the
Manual, "is a conveyance of property to a party with the
understanding that the property will be returned to the transferor after
the transferor's creditors lose interest in collecting their claims."' The
distinction is critical. As discussed below, the administrative and
judicial remedies available to an alleged recipient of a tax debtor's
property vary according to the Service's characterization of the
transaction."2 A "nominee" is entitled to almost no administrative
access, while the recipient of fraudulently conveyed property has early
access to the Service and courts."3
B Case Development by the Internal Revenue Service
When the Service chooses to proceed against a transferee as a
nominee, the Manual directs agents to consider certain circumstances
when developing the case, including:
a. the taxpayer is paying maintenance expenses,
b. the taxpayer is using the property as collateral for loans,
c. the taxpayer is paying state and local taxes on the property,
d. other use or benefit from the property[, and]
e. other relevant facts.214
After the consideration of these factors, the agent must get written
approval from the Service's in-house attorneys prior to filing a
nominee lien; however, subsequent enforcement of the lien occurs at
the field office's discretion, subject to further review upon levy."5
Nominee liens usually pertain to specific pieces of a delinquent
taxpayer's property that were conveyed to a nominee.2 16 "Since the
federal tax lien only attaches to property actually 'owned' by the
taxpayer, it may not reach all property that is, in fact, actually owned
by the nominee.""m The Service's litigation guidance also provides that
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1, 301.6330-1 (as amended in 2007) (neither
granting CDP rights to nominees); I.R.S. Notice CC-2006-019, supra note 56, at 10 ("The
IRS will not give an opportunity for a CDP hearing to a known nominee of ... the
taxpayer."). These deprivations contrast with the detailed procedural rights afforded
transferees under the INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.14.3.1.
213. Seediscussion supra note 212.
214. INTERNALREVENUE MANUAL, supranote 5, § 5.12.2.6.5(3) (2007).
215. Id. § 5.12.2.6.5(4)-(5).




[i]n situations where administrative action is contemplated against
property in the hands of a transferee or nominee, Service personnel
have been instructed to exercise caution and good judgment. District
counsel approval or confirmation of any determination of nominee,
transferee or alter ego status is required prior to initiation of lien or levy
211action.
In a perfect world, perhaps these admonitions would provide alleged
nominees with sufficient protection. In the real world, they do not.
C Case Development in Courts
A nominee who is lucky enough to retain counsel familiar with
the issue will very likely, at some point, find herself before a court.
Because the Manual, which is really just a set of internal operating
procedures, carries little weight as a legal authority, courts have looked
primarily to other jurisdictions when faced with nominee questions.1 9
Although the cases vary, most state and federal courts agree that the
widespread judicial definition of a nominee is "a person or entity who
holds legal title to property that in truth belongs to another who
exercises control over and realizes the benefit of it."
220
Due to the nonstatutory nature of the nominee theory, courts have
been faced with a dearth of state precedent.2 2' As a result, most of
them have, in the past, looked to other jurisdictions. 2 ' Accordingly, the
bulk of decisions can be traced to a single Montana case, Towe
Antique Ford Foundation v IRS, which was the first decision to
amalgamate factors used in other courts' decisions. 3 While not all
courts use the same list of factors to determine whether a person is a
nominee, many have settled on the following six, which are similar but
not identical to those named in the Manual:
(1) whether inadequate or no consideration was paid by the nominee;
218. I.R.S. Litig. Guidance Mem. GL-21, supra note 204.
219. See, e.g., Nantucket Vill. Dev. Co. v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,202, at 87,331-32 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (examining the reasoning of, among others, United
States v Letscher, 83 F Supp. 2d 367, 375 (S.D.N.Y 1999), and Hill v United States, 844 E
Supp. 263, 270 (WD.N.C. 1993), in trying to come to an understanding of nominee doctrine).
220. Sumpter v. United States, 302 E Supp. 2d 707, 720 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
221. See Hill, 844 F Supp. at 270 (turning to federal law after finding few state "cases
dealing specifically with nominee status").
222. Scoville v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,163, at 83,369 (WD.
Mo. 1999) (citing First Home Sav. Bank v. C & L Farms, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998); Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 791 F Supp. 1450, 1458 (D. Mont. 1992),
affd, 999 F2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (turning to other states' common law to determine
whether a person is the nominee of a delinquent taxpayer).
223. Towe, 791 E Supp. at 1454.
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(2) whether the property was placed in the nominee's name in
anticipation of a lawsuit or other liability while the transferor
remains in control of the property;
(3) whether there is a close relationship between the nominee and the
transferor;
(4) whether they failed to record the conveyance;
(5) whether the transferor retained possession; and
(6) whether the transferor continues to enjoy the benefits of the
transferred property."'
These factors are notoriously difficult to apply, particularly in
situations where the delinquent taxpayer and the accused nominee are
members of the same family... For instance, one author has noted a
Montana District Court opinion that
warned against according too much weight to the relationship factor in
the intra-family transfer context. Rejecting the Service's claim that a
taxpayer's son held property as the taxpayer's nominee, the Turk court
concluded that the Service's argument to apply the nominee theory
placed too much emphasis on the close relationship between the
taxpayer and his son. The court warned that the Service had allowed
the close relationship factor to "swallow each of the other categories.
This is not a reliable analysis.
2 2 6
224. Spotts v. United States, 2005 FED App. 0441P 11 n.2 (6th Cir.) (citing Porta-
John of Am., Inc. v. United States, 4 E Supp. 2d 688, 701 (E.D. Mich. 1998)). It bears noting
that some courts have not confined themselves to judicial sources of authority. For instance,
in Holman v United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,277, at 87,710 (D. Utah 2005),
the court discussed testimony of a Service officer. The officer explained that when the
Service suspects that property is held by a nominee, it typically serves a summons on the
utility companies serving the property to determine whether the delinquent taxpayer is
responsible for the relevant bills. Id. In Spotts, which relied on sister courts and the Manual
for guidance, the court quoted a letter from the Service to the taxpayer's counsel:
"[A] nominee filing should only be done where the facts and circumstances
attending the purchase and/or transfer of property clearly show that the property
was acquired and/or transferred in the name of another with a specific intent on the
part of a taxpayer to evade or defeat the payment of a known tax liability."
Spotts, 2005 FED App. 044 1P 5 n. 1. The test, in other words, has not only a factual
element, i.e., who pays the utility bills, but also an element of mens rea, and these elements
were inferred not only from judicial precedent but also from litigating positions of the
Service. Id
225. Pamela R. Shisler, Altering the Alter Ego Doctrine: Misapplication and Gender
Issues in Spotts v. United States, 59 TAX LAW. 309, 320 (2005) (highlighting gender issues in
nominee theory as applied to spouses).




The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also
addressed the danger of affording certain nominee factors too much
weight.227 In Spotts v United States, it wrote:
The factors used by courts to determine nominee status are most
enlightening when the alleged nominee and the alleged true beneficial
owner have the type of relationship where both individuals would not
normally be expected to simultaneously act as true owners. The factors
are less probative in the context of a home purchase by a married
couple because even if the home is only titled in one name, both
ordinarily act as true owners. Stated another way, several of the factors
used by courts will provide the same answer for every marital
relationship in this context, thus providing little utility in distinguishing
tax shams from legitimate titling decisions between spouses.
Regardless, the ultimate inquiry requires consideration of all the facts
and circumstances to determine the true beneficial owner of the
property.2
8
In order to understand the application of nominee theory, as with
any facts and circumstances determination, it is necessary not only to
iterate the applicable standard, but also to examine relevant case law.
The following paragraphs consider particular decisions of the Sixth
Circuit and its district courts.
D The Sixth Circuit as a Microcosm
Decisions of the Sixth Circuit provide a useful illustration of the
nominee theory at work. Each decision reaches a slightly different
conclusion. As noted below, the culprit behind courts' varied
interpretations of nominee theory may simply be the contrived nature
of the doctrine. The Service's creation of the nominee as a category of
transferee distinct from the recipient of a fraudulent conveyance has
provided courts with leeway for creative thought."9
The leading Sixth Circuit case on nominee theory is Spots.23° In
Spotts, a husband and wife purchased a home, which was titled in the
wife's name.2 1' The couple also participated in a tax shelter using an
offshore account."' They later divorced, and the husband moved out.
233
227. See Spotts, 2005 FED App. 044 IP, 11 n.2 ("[T]he ultimate inquiry requires
consideration of all the facts and circumstances...
228. Id.
229. See infr Part IVD.
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During the divorce proceedings, the husband's attorney advised him to
consult a lawyer about his offshore activities."' After doing so, the
husband filed amended tax returns but was unable to pay the entire
outstanding debt.23 As part of its collection action against the husband,
the Service placed a nominee lien on the wife's house. 6
The wife brought a quiet title action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and the court granted
summary judgment to the Service. 37 The Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's holding because the district court failed to properly
consider state law.38 The court noted that "[a] federal tax lien does not
arise or attach to property in which a person has no interest under state
law."'239 Consequently, the district court was required to consider
Kentucky's statutes and jurisprudence prior to granting summary
judgment for the government. 4
The Sixth Circuit noted that under Kentucky law, the purchase of
a residence by one spouse, who places title in the name of the other
spouse, is presumed to be a gift. 24' A gift, the court reasoned, was
different from a transfer to a nominee. ' It concluded that although
Kentucky recognized nominee transactions under the doctrine of
constructive trust, the district court had not properly considered the
state law regarding such transactions.243 Furthermore, the district court
failed to consider deposition testimony indicating that the husband had
no intention to avoid collection at the time he titled the house in his
wife's name.2" The court concluded that because the husband "had not
lived in the house or derived any beneficial interest related to the house
for more than fourteen months" before the lien arose, it was "far from
evident" that the wife was a nominee. 5
Prior to Spotts, the district courts in the Sixth Circuit were, and













246. Compare Andrews v. United States, 69 E Supp. 2d 972, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(holding that a fraudulent transferee was a nominee), affT 225 E3d 658 (2000), with Kaiser
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of state law in the nominee inquiry, and in Ohio, they disagreed about
the state's law itself '7 In Andrews v United States, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that because the
transfer of property from a mother to her son was a fraudulent
conveyance under Ohio's statute, the son was a nominee for purposes
of federal tax collection.24 The court therefore refused to grant
summary judgment to the son in a quiet title action brought against the
United States.249 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in a
summary opinion which held that "the taxpayer's transfer of property
to her son was fraudulent; and thus.., the lien attached to the property
in dispute by the IRS was valid."
25 0
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio in Kaiser v Stedman held that because Ohio had a law
of fraudulent conveyance upon which the Service could rely, the
Service was foreclosed from using a nominee lien."' In an opinion
that foreshadowed the Spotts decision, the court wrote that state law,
rather than federal law, controls the determination of whether an
individual is a nominee rather than the rightful owner of property.
252
The court could find "no reported federal opinions recognizing the
nominee doctrine under Ohio law."253 Furthermore, the United States
had cited no case applying the nominee doctrine in Ohio."4 The court
then delivered its coup de grace:
Moreover, the Court has an alternative justification for questioning
the applicability of the nominee doctrine in this case. Where, as here,
there is a conveyance of real estate claimed to be fraudulent and where,
as here, Ohio statutory law not only provides the remedy, but also sets
forth the standards for when a transfer is deemed to be fraudulent, this
Court is of the opinion that the statutory requirements govern the
transfer to the exclusion of some other theory such as the nominee
theory.
15
The court added, as a parting note, that the nominee factors on which
the government requested consideration were nearly identical to the
v. Stedman, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,861, at 89,856-57 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that
the Service could not use a nominee lien against a fraudulent transferee).
247. See cases cited supra note 246.
248. 69 E Supp. 2d at 981.
249. Id. at 973, 982.
250. Andrews v. United States, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,653 (6th Cir. 2000).
251. 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCI{) at 89,856-57.
252. Id. at 89,856.
253. Id.
254. Id
255. Id at 89,856-57 (citations omitted).
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fraudulent conveyance factors and refused, as a matter of law, to apply
nominee theory to the case."'
The outcome in Nantucket Village Development Co. v United
States was different.2 7 In Nantucket Village, the court criticized the
Kaiser decision while attempting to harmonize it with the holding in
Andrews.2"' The court described a veritable smorgasbord of reasoning
employed by other jurisdictions to reconcile state and federal law
where state law failed to explicitly recognize nominee doctrine.5 9 For
instance, some courts have held that it is well established that the
Service may pursue a nominee in order to satisfy the taxpayer's debt
without regard to a state's law.26 Other courts have held that the state
law and federal law were identical, and yet others have simply and
properly used the particular state's alter ego, constructive trust, or
equitable ownership doctrines to determine rights of an alleged
nominee to property.
2 61
The Northern District of Ohio chose the latter of these
approaches, which was in keeping with the Southern District's
reasoning in Kaiser2 The court found that contrary to the assertion of
the Southern District, Ohio law recognizes the concept of equitable
ownership, albeit without the using the term nominee.63 Citing an
Ohio case that relied upon Black Law Dictionary, the court wrote
that an equitable owner is
"recognized in equity as the owner of property, because the real and
beneficial use and title belong to him, although the bare legal title is
vested in another .... There may therefore be two 'owners' in respect
of the same property, one the nominal or legal owner, the other the
beneficial or equitable owner."2M
Finding this definition essentially the same as the Service's definition
of "a nominee and/or alter ego," the court then discussed the
recognition of equitable ownership by Ohio courts.265 It noted that in
256. Id. at 89,857.
257. 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,202, at 87,334-35 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 87,330-33.
260. Id. at 87,331 (citing United States v. Letscher, 83 E Supp. 2d 367, 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)).
261. Id at 87,334 (describing these approaches).
262. Id at 87,335. The Kaisercourt also looked to state doctrine. Kaiser v. Stedman,
99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,861, at 89,856-57 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
263. Nantucke, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,332 (citing Flint v. Holbrook, 608
N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
264. Id (quoting Flint, 608 N.E.2d at 814).
265. Id. at 87,332-33.
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Ohio, "one who makes out-of-pocket expenditures to complete repairs
to property, pays utility expenses and shares responsibility for monthly
mortgage payments may hold an equitable interest in the property,
despite the fact that another holds title."266 Accordingly, the court held
that Ohio recognizes nominee theory despite applying a different
nomenclature.267
Each of the district court cases described above-Andrews,
Kaiser, and Nantucket Villag--provided the groundwork for Spotts,
the court's most current interpretation of nominee theory. Three things
are apparent in these decisions. First, the Service must rely upon state
law to establish that a nominee does not have beneficial ownership
rights in property to which he holds title. 68 Second, courts do not fully
understand the role of state fraudulent conveyance statutes in nominee
lien cases, and this lack of understanding stems from the contrived
nature of the nominee lien in contrast to the state or federal statutory
nature of fraudulent conveyance.269 Finally, the determination of
whether a title holder is a nominee is practically indistinguishable from
the determination of whether the title holder received property through
fraudulent conveyance.' This suggests that in all but the strangest of
instances, fraudulent conveyance proceedings would be a sufficient
avenue of collection for the Service.
E. A Blurry Line
Indeed, nominee theory and fraudulent conveyance are so closely
related that the Service frequently presents the two concepts to courts
in tandem.' In a recent Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum, the
266. Id. at 87,332.
267. Id. at 87,332-34.
268. Id. at 87,329.
269. See Kaiser v. Stedman, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,861, at 89,852-53 (S.D.
Ohio 1999) (noting that fraudulent conveyance is governed by an Ohio statute).
270. See Nantucket, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,332-33 (noting the similarities
between the Service's definitions of nominee and fraudulent conveyance situations).
271. See United States v. Swan, 467 E3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2006); Hatchett v. United
States, 2003 FED App. 0176P, 2 (6th Cir.); United States v. Noble, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50,226, at 87,391 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Vance, No. 99-6291, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12156, at *3 (10th Cir. June 2, 2000); United States v. Scherping, 187 E3d 796,
799-801 (8th Cir. 1999); Colby B. Found. v. United States, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,211, at 87,306 (9th Cir. 1999); LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
1997); Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Vellalos, No. 92-15491, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 6072, at *9 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 1993);
United States v. Isaac, No. 91-5830, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16657, at *3 (6th Cir. July 10,
1992); United States v. Gonzales, No. 91-1074, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 33797, at *2 (10th
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Service advised that it "may rely on alternate theories provided the
precise distinctions between the theories are recognized and there are
facts to support each theory."'272 The Manual outlines the distinctions
between the theories. " According to the Manual, a transfer to a
nominee is merely a "simulated transfer" that is "not intended to divest
the transferor of any rights to the property."7" In contrast, a fraudulent
conveyance is usually "intended to effect an actual transfer of property
or an interest in property 275 It is therefore the subjective intent of the
taxpayer, an issue of fact, that determines whether nominee theory or
fraudulent conveyance laws apply. 6 The distinction is critical. The
Manual states, "A nominee situation can be dealt with under the
administrative nominee procedures, including the filing of nominee
liens."2 " Fraudulent conveyance, however, "can only be set aside by a
court.
278
The transferor's intent seems a very slender thread upon which to
hang a transferee, particularly when a difference in due process results.
How does the Service distinguish one intent from another? Table 1
shows, side by side, the Service's most recent iteration of the nominee
lien and fraudulent conveyance tests. All seven of the nominee lien
factors are nearly identical to fraudulent conveyance factors. One
wonders, then, whether the Service might not choose its theory, or
alternative use of both theories, simply on the basis of prosecutorial
ease. It may file a nominee lien and, if challenged, defend its
collection action not only on nominee grounds but also on fraudulent
conveyance grounds-a procedural lose/lose proposition for the
alleged nominee.
Table 1: Comparison of Nominee Liability
and Fraudulent Conveyance Factors 9
Nominee Liability Fraudulent Conveyance
No consideration or inadequate No consideration or inadequate
consideration paid by nominee consideration for the transfer
Cir. Dec. 17, 1991); Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 E2d 240, 245-47 (5th Cir.
1990); Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 E2d 725, 728-29 (11 th Cir. 1989).
272. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem., supra note 18, at 15.
273. INTERNAL REvENUE MANuAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.14.2.4.





279. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem., supra note 18, at 14-15.
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Courts, naturally, conflate the two theories. Despite the
mutually exclusive nature of fraudulent conveyance and nominee
theory-in one, the taxpayer intends to transfer the property, and in the
other, he intends to keep it-courts have, with some regularity, used
the two interchangeably.28' For instance, in the oft-cited Towe Antique
Ford Foundation case, the district court determined that the foundation
against which the Service had collected was the alter ego or nominee
of the delinquent taxpayer and that the taxpayer's transfer of cars to the
foundation was a fraudulent conveyance.282 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's alter ego
280. United States v. Swan, 467 E3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vance,
No. 99-6291, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12156, at *2 (10th Cir. June 2, 2000); United States v.
Boomershine, No. 91-7107, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16742, at *5 (10th Cir. July 13, 1992);
Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 E2d 725, 728 (11 th Cir. 1989).
281. See cases cited supra note 280.
282. Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 999 F2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993).
Nominee Liability Fraudulent Conveyance
Property placed in the name of Transfer made in anticipation of
the nominee in anticipation of suit or occurrence of liability
suit or occurrence of liability
while transferor maintains
control over property.
Close relationship between Close relationship between
transferor and nominee transferor and transferee
Failure to record the conveyance Failure to record the conveyance
Retention of possession by the Retention of possession by the
transferor transferor
Expenses of the property paid by Assessment of real property taxes
the transferor in the name of the transferor
Exercise of dominion or control Reservation of interest, trust, or
by the transferor benefit by the transferor
Transferor retains security in
excess of the transferee's debt
Conveyance not in the usual course
of business/transaction made in
secrecy or haste
Transfer of all of the debtor's
property
Debtor made insolvent by the
transfer
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conclusion and held that, as a result, it would not reach the issue of
fraudulent conveyance.283 The court failed, however, to note that the
two doctrines could not simultaneously apply."4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held similarly in United States v
Vance, when it affirmed the district court's holding that a transferee
was a nominee who had received property from a delinquent taxpayer
through fraudulent conveyance."'
The Tenth Circuit is not alone in its confusion. Judge Posner
wrote in a Seventh Circuit case: "Suppose a person who wants to
evade taxes parks his property with a friend or a family member. That
would be a fraudulent conveyance, and so the person to whom the
property was conveyed would be deemed the taxpayer's 'nominee' and
forced to cough it up."'286 This analysis does not, as noted earlier,
coincide with the Service's conception of two distinct doctrines. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also
conflated the two concepts."7 In Shades Ridge Holding Co. v United
States case, it used the heading "Nominee/Fraudulent Transferee
Claims" to denominate a discussion of nominee status. 88
How should attorneys interpret courts' conflation of the Service's
two distinct doctrines? Perhaps the doctrines are not distinct after all.
The difference highlighted by the Manual, the transferor's intent with
regard to the ownership of property, may be the perennial "distinction
without a difference." ' In both nominee and fraudulent conveyance
situations, a delinquent taxpayer has transferred property to a third
party in order to evade the Service's collection action.98 In either
situation, the Service will turn its attention to the third party.29' It
therefore seems arbitrary to make the level of due process that the third
party receives dependent upon the Service's opinion of the transferor's
subjective intent.
283. Id. at 1393-94.
284. Id.
285. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12156, at *3-4. The Sixth Circuit also conflated the two
theories, stating that "[i]f a taxpayer attempts to avoid collection of a tax debt by transferring
property into the names of third parties who act as nominees ... the transfers will be
considered fraudulent." Boomershine, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16742, at *5.
286. United States v. Swan, 467 E3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2006).
287. Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. United States, 888 F.2d 725, 728-29 (11 th Cir.
1989).
288. Id at 728.
289. See Livingston v. Md. Ins. Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 506, 537 (1813).




The distinction, and the coinciding difference in the tenor of the
collection action, are particularly troublesome when viewed in light of
section 6901 of the Code, which the Service may look to in fraudulent
conveyance cases but refuses to consult in nominee cases.292 Section
6901, which is discussed in greater detail below, provides that the
liability of a transferee must be assessed and collected in the same
manner as the debt of the delinquent taxpayer to which the liability
relates.293 Transferees under section 6901, then, have the same access
to collection due process hearings as the taxpayers from whom they
received property.9 Nominees, however, are not "transferees" under
section 6901 according to the Service and are therefore once again
denied access to sections 6320 and 6330.295
Some courts have adopted the Service's position.296 For example,
in Lernaster v United States, the Sixth Circuit held that a son who
received title to the assets of a trucking business from his father, but
who did not participate in the business, was a nominee rather than a
transferee.2 97 Although the son argued that the Service owed him due
298
process under section 6901, the court found otherwise. It wrote,
"The flaw in plaintiffs' argument lies in the misguided notion that the
issue of transferee rights is somehow involved in this dispute."'2 9 Other
courts have reached similar conclusions."° In Al-Kim, Inc. v United
States, the Ninth Circuit wrote that section 6901 was inapplicable
where "[a]lthough the Commissioner addressed the appellants
collectively as 'alter egos, nominees, or transferees,' he treated them as
292. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem., supra note 18, at 15 (providing that
transferee liability, which can be asserted administratively under section 6901, is generally
based on fraudulent conveyance under state law).
293. I.R.C. § 6901(a) (2000).
294. Id.
295. See Baum Hydraulics Corp. v. United States, 2005-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,623, at 89,713 (D. Neb. 2005) (discussing the government's argument that "[t]he filing
of a notice of federal tax lien, including one that alleges a transferee/alter ego/nominee status
is not a means of asserting transferee liability under § 6901" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
296. See Lemaster v. United States, 891 E2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
because the plaintiff was an alter ego or nominee of the delinquent taxpayer, procedural
requirements for collection under section 6901 were irrelevant); Al-Kim, Inc. v. United
States, 650 E2d 944, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that section 6901 is inapplicable to
nominees); Sequoia Prop. & Equip. Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,841, at 90,276 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that nominees are not entitled to procedural
protections under section 6901).
297. Lemaster, 891E2dat 117, 119.
298. Id at 119.
299. Id.
300. See supm note 296 and accompanying text.
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alter egos or nominees, not transferees.""' And, the position was
summarized in Sequoia Property & Equipment Ltd Partnership v
United States, which held: "Under 26 U.S.C. § 6901, the IRS is
authorized to collect a tax debt from a transferee of the initial tax
debtor. Transferees are entitled to the same procedural protections as
the original tax debtor. Nominees... however, are not entitled to those
procedural protections." °2
The Service's reason for not treating alleged nominees as
transferees under section 6901 is not immediately apparent. The
statute provides that "the term 'transferee' includes donee, heir,
legatee, devisee, and distributee. '3 3 While this definition does not
explicitly (or even implicitly) include nominees, it does not exclude
them either. The same is true of the Treasury Regulations, which
provide a fuller interpretation. " The regulations define transferee as
also including "the assignee or donee of an insolvent person" as well
as "all other classes of distributees." '° These additional categories
seem broad enough to encompass alleged nominees. Furthermore,
nothing in the legislative history evinces an intention to exclude
nominees (although neither does it include them). Finally, although it
refuses to apply section 6901 to alleged nominees, the Service
sometimes employs the terms nominee and transferee in tandem when
issuing notices of nominee liens. °6 When taken in full, the statute,
regulations, and common usage suggest that nominees are not so
different from transferees as to deserve procedural ostracism, if,
indeed, they are different at all.
Whatever its reason, the Service's insistence that section 6901
does not apply to alleged nominees leaves them in a position unlike
that of any other transferee subject to collection. No provision of the
301. 650 E2d at 947 n.8.
302. 97-2 US. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,841, at 90,276 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (citations
omitted).
303. I.R.C. § 6901(h) (2000).
304. Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(b) (1967).
305. Id.
306. See Al-Kim, Inc. v. United States, 650 E2d 944, 946 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that
the levies designated plaintiffs as "nominees and transferees" of tax debtors); State St. Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, 729 E Supp. 1402, 1403 (D. Mass. 1990) (denying injunctive
relief to plaintiffs who sought to enjoin the Service from instituting collection action against
trustees as transferees or nominees); Williamson v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2941, 2944
(1993) (stating that the Service filed an NFTL against a "nominee/transferee"); Estate of
DeNiro, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 721, 722 (1979) (stating that the Service filed a jeopardy
assessment against the DeNiro brothers as "nominees or transferees" of father's estate); Wills
Corp. v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 174, 176 (1969) (noting that the Service made alternative
claims that a corporation was a transferee or a nominee of the tax debtors).
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Code provides them with administrative or judicial review of the
collection action prior to levy. This situation is particularly unfair
because a collection action can span an entire decade before the
Service levies against the alleged nominee's property.' During that
time, the nominee cannot use the property to secure loans, cannot
alienate the property for its fair market value, and cannot effectively
plan for the future."' Furthermore, the alleged nominee risks losing
the value of any repairs or improvements that she makes to the
property." This situation highlights the relative disadvantage of an
individual who has been labeled "nominee" by the Service in
comparison to any other recipient of a tax debtor's property.
V WHAT CAN'T A NOMINEE Do?
The crux of the matter is that alleged nominees should have a
means by which to receive a prompt administrative and judicial review
of the Service's determination of nominee status. However, a review
of the available authorities makes it apparent that nominees are not
afforded such a means." ' Despite the taxpayer's recent receipt of
collection due process rights,"' alleged nominees continue to lack an
effective means by which to contest the Service's allegation of
nominee status.312
As described in the prior Parts, the Service denies alleged
nominees collection due process in such situations because the
nominee is "not the taxpayer."3 ' In a recent notice issued by the Office
of the Chief Counsel, the Service stated that collection due process
rights are "only available to the delinquent taxpayer-the person liable
to pay the tax due after notice and demand who refuses or neglects to
pay. The [Service] will not give an opportunity for a CDP hearing to a
known nominee of, or person holding property of, the taxpayer."' The
307. See 1.R.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2000) (providing that the statute of limitations for
collection is ten years).
308. See supra Part I.
309. See supra Part I.
310. See, e.g., Collection Appeal Rights, I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, at 3 (rev. Aug. 2007)
("You ... cannot proceed to court if you don't agree with Appeals' decision in your CAP
case.").
311. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 746-50.
312. I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, supm note 310, at 3.
313. Treas. Reg. §§301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7, 301.6330-1(a)(3), Q&A-A2 (as
amended in 2007).
314. I.R.S. Notice CC-2006-019, supra note 56, at 10.
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following paragraphs summarize due process rights that the Service
has declared inapplicable to alleged nominees.
A. Denial of Collection Due Process
What does an alleged nominee miss? As discussed in Part I,
collection due process is available to an ordinary taxpayer in two
situations: (1) upon the filing of a notice of federal tax lien.. and
(2) upon the filing of a notice of intent to levy.36 As described above, a
taxpayer has the right to receive notice of the filing of an NFTL,3 7 to
administratively appeal the notice,"8 and to seek a judicial review of
the appeals determination. The effects of these rights are many.
First, the taxpayer has specific knowledge about the Service's
collection action. 2° Second, the taxpayer can administratively oppose
the collection action and can be assured that the Service will consider
his position. 2' In addition, the taxpayer has the right to petition and
receive a hearing regarding any error or impropriety in the filing of the
NFTL.22 If, at the hearing, the Service determines that the filing was
erroneous, it is required to issue expeditiously a certificate of release
of the lien.323 If, instead, the Service determines that the filing was not
erroneous, then the taxpayer may seek judicial review of its
determination.324 Thus, the taxpayer has multiple opportunities to
petition for release of the lien on his property. An alleged nominee, in
contrast, is denied these opportunities.
At the levy stage, the taxpayer has the right to receive notice of
his right to request an administrative appeals conference,3 to receive
an administrative appeals conference,32 and to seek judicial review of
the appeals determination.2 7 Again, these rights protect the taxpayer in
many ways. First, the Service may not place a levy on the taxpayer's
property before it has notified the taxpayer of his right to request an
315. I.R.C. § 6320 (West Supp. 2007).
316. Id. § 6330 (West, Westlaw through 2007 amendments).
317. Id. § 6320(a)(1) (2000).
318. Id. § 6320(b).
319. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(b)(2), Q&A-B3 (as amended in 2007).
320. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(3).
321. Id § 6320(b) (West Supp. 2007).
322. Id. § 6326(a) (2000).
323. Id. § 6326(b).
324. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(b)(2), Q&A-B3.
325. I.R.C. § 6330(a).
326. Id § 6330(b) (West Supp. 2007).
327. Id § 6330(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(b)(2), Q&A-B2.
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appeals conference. 28 The effect of this requirement is simultaneously
to provide the taxpayer with specific knowledge about the Service's
action while delaying the action until the taxpayer can protect himself
should the action be unfounded.29 In addition, the taxpayer has the
right to an appeals conference if requested and can therefore prevent
the levy altogether if he succeeds in asserting that the levy would be
improper."' Finally, if the appeals officer renders an unfavorable
determination, the taxpayer may seek a judicial review of the
determination in the Tax Court."' As with section 6320, the Service
denies alleged nominees access to any of these rights."2
How does the Service justify its position? One source of
authority on this issue comes in the form of a rather confused district
court decision.333 In Forman v United States, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois rendered nominee liens
essentially unreviewable within the district. ' The Service sought to
collect the tax debt of a husband by placing a nominee lien on property
held solely by his wife." In his CDP hearing, the husband argued that
the property titled in his wife's name was not his property and was
therefore immune from collection. 6  When the appeals office
rendered an adverse decision, both the husband and the wife filed an
action in the district court.' The wife, who was an alleged nominee,
argued that she had been denied CDP rights under section 6330.331 She
also filed a claim to quiet title.339 The husband, in turn, argued that the
Service could not legally collect property that did not belong to him. '
The court granted summary judgment to the Service on all but the
quiet title claim."'
In its ruling, the court determined that the wife did not have CDP
rights with regard to the lien because she was not the "taxpayer" under
328. I.R.C. § 6330(a)(1) (2000).
329. Id. § 6330(e).
330. Id § 6343.
331. Id § 6330(d) (West Supp. 2007); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(b)(2), Q&A-B2.
332. SeeTreas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(b)(2), Q&A-B5.
333. Forman v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,418, at 88,193 (N.D. Ill.
2005).
334. Id. at 88,194 (holding that because plaintiff was not a taxpayer she had no right to
judicial review).
335. Id. at 88,193.
336. Id.
337. Id
338. Id. at 88,194.
339. Id at 88,193.
340. Id at 88,194.
341. Id
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section 6321, a section that permits the Service to file a notice of
federal tax lien.42 Second, the court determined that the husband did
not have standing to contest the nominee lien.43 The court reasoned
that because the husband had disclaimed ownership of the property, he
had no justiciable interest.' Thus, the court effectively provided an
administrative lose-lose situation to the Forman plaintiffs and to others
in their situation." The husband could not plead an interest in the
property without subjecting it to collection; therefore, he could not
raise administrative arguments or bring suit. 46 But the wife, who had a
justiciable interest in the property, was precluded from seeking
administrative relief because she was the actual, rather than the
nominal, target of the Service's collection action.37 Although the court
did not dismiss the wife's claim to quiet title, as we will discuss below,
such actions are often unsatisfactory for reasons of time and expense.'
The Forman plaintiffs' situation was untenable. Collection due
process, if applied to nominees, would provide an avenue by which
taxpayers and alleged nominees could avoid the administrative catch-
22 created by the Forman court's reasoning. Unfortunately,
administrative and judicial authorities deny alleged nominees access to
the relevant statutory protections.3"9 As a result, alleged nominees are
precluded from directly defending their interests in property under







348. Id. ("[The wife]'s action to quiet title, remains.").
349. See infra Part VB-D.
350. It seems unthinkable, given our popular notion of constitutional due process, that
the government could encumber any citizen's property without providing some timely and
effective means of review. Nonetheless, in 1931, the Supreme Court held that collection of
taxes without a preseizure judicial hearing did not offend the Due Process Clause as long as
the taxpayer was afforded a postseizure determination of rights. See Phillips v. Comm'r, 283
U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). Alleged nominees have such remedies in the form of quiet title and
wrongful levy suits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (2000); I.R.C. § 7426 (2000). Therefore, despite
the serious drawbacks associated with those suits, no constitutional challenge will force the
Service to treat alleged nominees differently. Although the Court later refined this position
somewhat, the current revenue laws continue to pass constitutional muster. Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (reaffirming Phillips but emphasizing that seizure before
an opportunity for a hearing is permissible only in limited circumstances).
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B. Denial of Transferee Status Under Section 6901
Section 6901 of the Code, if it applied to alleged nominees,
would provide indirect access to sections 6320 and 6330 and a wealth
of due process rights, including the right to make an offer in
compromise to settle the case."' The section provides that "[t]he
amounts of the following liabilities shall ... be assessed, paid, and
collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and
limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the
liabilities were incurred. 3' 2  Congress made the statute specifically
applicable to income taxes, which means that if it were available, it
would provide due process rights in most nominee cases."'
When the nominee is not assessed under section 6901, she is not
afforded the CDP rights provided to a "transferee.""35 The CDP rights
provided to a transferee are identical to those provided the taxpayer
and are sweeping."' With a nominee lien in place, however, it is
possible for an alleged nominee's property to remain encumbered for
more than a decade. 6 In addition, the alleged nominee is precluded
from petitioning the Tax Court for a redetermination of tax liability.
3 7
351. I.R.C. § 6901; id. § 7122 (West Supp. 2007).
352. I.R.C. § 6901(a) (2000).
353. Id.
354. See, e.g., Al-Kim, Inc. v. United States, 650 E2d 944, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating that section 6901 does not apply to nominees).
355. INTERNAL REvENuEMANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.14.3.1(4). The Manualstates:
a. A notice of transferee or fiduciary liability must be mailed to the last known
address of the transferee or fiduciary.
b. The transferee or fiduciary may petition the United States Tax Court.
c. The liability will be assessed against the transferee or fiduciary if(1) the Tax
Court enters a decision against the transferee or fiduciary; (2) the transferee
or fiduciary defaults on the notice of liability; or (3) the transferee or
fiduciary agrees to an assessment of the liability.
d. Once the liability is assessed, a lien is created which attaches to all property
of the transferee or fiduciary. A Notice of Federal Tax Lien must be filed to
protect the Service's interests under I.R.C. § 6323.
e. The assessment may be collected administratively from all property and
rights to property of the transferee or fiduciary.
Id. § 5.17.14.3.1.(4).
356. See I.R.C. § 6502. Other portions of the Code may toll the statute upon the
occurrence of various events, which means that a collection action may last for more than a
decade. Id.
357. See L.V Castle Inv. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 465 E3d 1243, 1247 (11 th Cir. 2006)
(holding that a transferee cannot petition the tax court until he has been assessed liability
under section 6901); Gott v. Live Poultry Transit Co., 153 A. 801, 806 (Del. Ch. 1931)
("Where there is no attempt to assess a tax against a transferee as such ... the transferee is
not the taxpayer and is therefore not entitled to take an appeal against a proposed deficiency
assessment.").
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As noted above, alleged nominees lack standing.358 As a consequence,
the Service cannot effectively be challenged on the issue of a
nominee's status. Instead, alleged nominees seeking a judicial remedy
must pursue either a quiet title action or a wrongful levy suit.59
Section 6902 specifies that in transferee cases, the Service must
present evidence that the person from whom it seeks to collect "is
liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer.36° No comparable
requirement exists for wrongful levy or quiet title actions."' In those
actions, the alleged nominee, and not the Service, will bear the burden
of proof.362
Another right that is unavailable to an alleged nominee, but that is
available to transferees, is the offer in compromise. 63 By definition, an
offer in compromise is the settlement of unpaid tax accounts for less
than the full amount of the assessed tax balance."6 Generally, the
Service will accept an offer in compromise when it is unlikely that the
entire tax liability can be collected. 65 Thus, if a transferee is assessed
liability under section 6901, and the Service is unlikely to collect the
entire tax liability, a transferee may attempt to negotiate a settlement.
For instance, in Revenue Ruling 72-436, the Service assessed liability
against a transferee under section 6901 and held that "[t]he acceptance
of the transferee's offer in compromise does not compromise the
liability of the transferor."'366 Thus, the offer in compromise is clearly
available to a transferee under section 6901.
In contrast, when a recipient of transferred property is treated as a
nominee, she may not pursue an offer in compromise.367 In Pivate
Letter Ruling 1999-17-020, the Service held that an offer in
compromise is not available to the nominee in his own right when he is
held liable via a nominee lien. 8 The Service also stated that a
"nominee lien can be extinguished only by satisfying the underlying
liability, whether by full payment or by compromise agreement
358. See supm note 357 and accompanying text.
359. See infra Part VI.
360. I.R.C. § 6902(a).
361. See infra Part VI.
362. See infraPart VI.
363. I.R.C. § 7122(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("The [Service] may compromise any civil or
criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws.....
364. Id
365. INTERNAL REvENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 1.5.18 (1992); id § 5.8.1.1.3
(2005).
366. Rev. Rul. 72-436, 1972-2 C.B. 643.
367. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-17-020 (Jan. 21, 1999).
368. Id. at 2.
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executed by an indivdual with authoity to do so."3 '9  The Service
made it clear that a nominee is not an "individual with authority"
unless the taxpayer authorizes the nominee to enter the offer in
compromise on the taxpayer's behalf.7° Thus, without the taxpayer's
authority to enter a binding offer in compromise on the taxpayer's
behalf, the nominee may not seek this remedial measure. 7' Finally,
even if the offer in compromise were available to the nominee, it would
not be a favorable option for the nominee since the nominee would be
paying the taxpayer's debt. Transferees under section 6901 are not
faced with a similar problem.72
Despite its procedural advantages, the application of section 6901
to alleged nominees would be a double-edged sword. The statute
specifies that tax must be assessed against a transferee. ' In other
words, a transferee is more than just the holder of a transferor's
property. She is actually liable for the transferor's debt, which means
that the Service is not limited to collecting against the transferred
property, and it can reach any of the transferee's assets.374
Liability for the taxpayer's debt is undoubtedly a disadvantage,
but as such, it may be outweighed by another provision of the Code
that provides access to judicial review of the Service's determination of
transferee status." Under section 6901, a transferee may seek judicial
review in any instance in which the transferor could do so.37 6 When a
transferee seeks review, section 6902 provides the following: "In
proceedings before the Tax Court the burden of proof shall be upon the
Secretary to show that a petitioner is liable as a transferee of property
369. Id. (emphasis added).
370. Id
371. Id.
372. Rev. Rul. 72-436, 1972-2 C.B. 644.
373. I.R.C. § 6901 (2000). The regulations provide:
The amount for which a transferee of property of ... [a] taxpayer ... shall be
assessed against such transferee... and paid and collected in the same manner and
subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of a deficiency in the
tax with respect to which such liability is incurred ....
Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(a)(1) (1967).
374. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.17.14.2.5 ("The creditor may
recover judgment against the transferee for the value of the asset transferred." (emphasis
added)).
375. I.R.C. § 6901. The regulations add that "[t]he provisions of the Code made
applicable by section 6901(a) to the liability of a transferee ... includethe provisions relating
to ... the filing of a petition with the Tax Court of the United States and the filing of a
petition for review of the Tax Court's decision." Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(a)(3) (emphasis
added).
376. I.R.C. § 6901(a).
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of a taxpayer .... 07' The intent of this provision is clear: it was
designed to protect persons accused of receiving property from a tax
debtor when the property should have been used to satisfy the tax debt.
Nominees fall into this class of persons; therefore, they should be
provided an opportunity to put the Service to its proof on the issue of
their status.
They are not so provided. Despite the plain language of section
6901, the Service and courts have found the statute inapplicable to
alleged nominees. 7 ' The Service views section 6901 as merely one of
several options by which it may hold the recipient of transferred
property liable for a taxpayer's debt. 9 These options include, but are
not limited to: (1) filing suit for a declaration of fraudulent
conveyance,38° (2) filing a nominee lien, ' and (3) administratively
imposing transferee liability under section 69012 From the Service's
viewpoint, each of these options provides a method by which it may
collect the liability of the taxpayer from a third party.3 3 The Service's
assertion that these methods may be used virtually interchangeably
allows it to choose what level of due process rights will be provided to
the third party.
Although it seems extraordinary, courts have upheld the Service's
position and have determined that an alleged nominee cannot be
treated as a section 6901 transferee unless the Service has taken
specific steps to assess the nominee as such. '  In Kellogg v
Commissioner, the Tax Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the
petitioner's claim because no notice of transferee liability had been
issued to petitioner.8 ' The Kellogg court found that although the
petitioner had received a letter regarding taxes due for another, the
letter was not in fact a notice of transferee liability because the letter
did not determine the amount owed and did not notify the petitioner
that a liability would be assessed. 86 Since the petitioner had not
received a notice of transferee liability that satisfied section 6901, the
377. Id § 6902(a).
378. SeesupraPart .
379. See INTERNAL REvENuE MANUAL, suprm note 5, §§ 5.17.2.4.8.2, 5.17.14.1,
5.17.14.3.1.
380. Id § 5.17.14.1.
381. Id § 5.17.2.4.8.2.
382. Id § 5.17.14.3.1.
383. Seeid §§ 5.17.2.4.8.2, 5.17.14.1, 5.17.14.3.1.
384. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 167, 175 (1987) (holding that only proper





court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the petitioner's
case.
In L. V Castle Investment Group, Inc. v Commissioner, the
Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the Kellogg holding when it held that the
transferee must receive a notice of transferee liability under section
6901 in order to challenge the Commissioner's determination of tax
liability.38" The Castle court explained that only after a transferee
received notice of tax liability under section 6901 would the court have
jurisdiction to entertain an argument regarding the due process rights
afforded to transferees through that section.389 Finally, as noted above,
a handful of courts have ignored the jurisdictional nature of the
transferee assessment and have specifically held that a nominee cannot
be a transferee under section 6901.9 It is, therefore, absolutely clear
that alleged nominees cannot seek relief through section 6901.
In summary, the Service has more or less created a variety of
methods by which it may collect a taxpayer's debt from a recipient of
transferred property, and although these methods are applied to
similarly situated property recipients, each provides a different level of
due process. The Service also takes the position that it is not required
to treat an alleged nominee as a transferee for purposes of section
6901, even though these two categories of property recipients are
virtually indistinguishable."' This position leaves the Service free to
choose the method, and therefore the level, of due process to which a
recipient of transferred property will have access. Consequently, it
may categorize nearly any property recipient as a nominee, thereby
depriving the recipient of administrative CDP By doing so, the
Service also avoids bearing the burden of proof under section 6902."2
387. Id
388. L.V Castle Inv. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 465 E3d 1243, 1247-48 (11 th Cir. 2006).
389. Id; see Gott v. Live Poultry Transit Co., 153 A. 801, 806 (Del. Ch. 1931).
390. See supraPart V
391. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem., supra note 18, at 14-15 (listing nearly
identical factors for determining nominee or transferee status).
392. It bears noting that an alleged nominee, like other persons, can seek an injunction
within limited confines. However, the injunction is statutorily prohibited when sought
regarding the assessment or collection of nominee liability for income taxes. I.R.C.
§ 7421(b)(1) (2000). Although the statutory language clearly bars injunctions in the context
mentioned, the Supreme Court has provided a two-part exception to the rule. Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). This exception requires the
petitioner to prove the following: (1) it must appear "under the most liberal view of the law
and the facts" that the government will not be able to establish its claim and (2) that the
petitioner will "suffer irreparable injury" without an injunction. Id. The two-part test was
reaffirmed by a later decision that more clearly stated that an injunction may not issue unless
"(1) it is 'clear that under no circumstances could the government ultimately prevail' and
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Furthermore, an alleged nominee, because she is not a transferee under
section 6901, cannot even compromise the amount owed to the
Service. " ' It is therefore not an overstatement to say that alleged
nominees, whether or not innocent, find themselves in a situation that
is difficult when compared to that of similarly situated recipients of
property whom the Service classifies as transferees under section
6901.
C Admin'strativeAppeal ofan Erroneous Tax Lien
Another option that could, but does not, provide a remedy for the
nominee is the administrative appeal of an erroneous tax lien. Section
6326 provides that any person may appeal to the Secretary after the
filing of a notice of federal tax lien against his property, but only in
such form and at such time as the Secretary prescribes by regulation.9
The regulations for section 6326 provide that "any person" may appeal
for release of a lien by alleging an error in the filing of the notice of
lien.395  However, the regulations limit the statute to four situations,
none of which apply to an alleged nominee under ordinary
circumstances. 6
In fact, the Service has specifically considered and barred the
possibility of a nominee petition under section 6326."'7 The preamble
to the applicable final regulations notes that the Service received
several comments involving substantive challenges to the lien "which
Congress did not intend to include under section 6326."398 It provides
(2) 'equity jurisdiction' otherwise exists." Comm'r v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 627 (1976)
(quoting Williams Packng, 370 U.S. at 7). It is virtually impossible for any transferee to
meet the requirements of the exception, and courts consistently follow the Williams Packing
interpretation and application of section 7421 (b). See Lovell v. United States, 795 E2d 976,
977 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (denying the plaintiffs' request for an injunction because they had not
shown irreparable harm); Shannon v. United States, 521 F2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1975) (restating
the Williams Packing test); Ross v. United States, 861 E Supp. 406, 407-08 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
(denying the plaintiff's motion for an injunction because they had met their burden of
showing the government could not establish a claim); Bailey v. Kelley, 372 E Supp. 449, 452
(N.D. Ohio 1974) (restating the Williams Packingtest); Tamburri v. Graham, 127 E Supp. 47,
47-48 (D. Conn. 1953) (denying the plaintiff's request for an injunction because they had not
shown irreparable harm). As a result, the courts cannot and will not exercise jurisdiction over
a plea for injunction unless the petitioner has proven that the bar of section 7421(b) is
inapplicable. Shannon, 521 F2d at 56, 60.
393. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-17-020, supra note 367, at 2.
394. I.R.C. § 6326 (2000).
395. Treas. Reg. § 301.6326-1(a) (1989).
396. Id. § 301.6326-1(b).
397. 56 Fed. Reg. 19,947 (May 1, 1999). It is the Service, rather than the Treasury,




that "two parties suggested that the final regulations should provide the
right to appeal the filing of nominee liens. However, whether or not a
nominee lien is properly filed depends upon who actually owns the
property in question, the liable taxpayer or the nominee." '9  The
preamble concludes that such an issue is substantive and therefore
does not come within the aegis of section 6326." 0 Accordingly, alleged
nominees are denied even this small procedural advantage.
D Suits for Cil DamagesArising from Unauthorized Collection
Actions
Suits for civil damages are similarly unavailable. At its core, the
Service's wrongful use of a nominee lien is an offense against the
alleged nominee, and when denied administrative due process, the
nominee's natural inclination may be to file suit. Generally, citizens do
not have the right to sue the United States, even though the United
States committed the offense, because its sovereignty renders it
immune from suit."°' Nevertheless, the federal government may
statutorily waive its sovereign immunity. 2  Such a waiver must be
unequivocally expressed through clear congressional consent, and
absent such consent, courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain a
suit." 3 Taxpayers have such a waiver in section 7433 for unauthorized
collection actions."  Specifically, the Code states that a taxpayer may
sue the United States for civil damages if an officer or employee of the
Service recklessly, intentionally, or negligently disregards any
provision under the Code or the Treasury Regulations. "
The nominee, however, does not have this remedy at her disposal.
Such a result stems from the Supreme Court's requirements that any
waiver of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed in
statutory text" "not be implied," be "strictly construed," 6 and not be
"'enlarge[d] ... beyond what the language requires.""' 7 Courts are
bound by these mandates when applying section 7433, and, as a result,
many who attempt to sue the United States under section 7433 are
399. Id.
400. Id
401. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981).
402. Id
403. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
404. I.R.C. § 7433(a) (2000).
405. Id. § 7433(b).
406. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
407. United States v. Nordic Viii., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983)).
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denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."8 For example, in Matrix
Development Corp. v United States, the plaintiffs sued the United
States for wrongful placement of a nominee lien on their home.4"9 The
plaintiffs claimed that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case
because section 7433 provided an applicable waiver of sovereign
immunity.4 ' Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they constituted
"taxpayers" for purposes of the statute and therefore were entitled to
civil damages."' The court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and in so doing stated that the plaintiffs were "innocent
third parties, neither of whom is ... the assessed taxpayer."" The
court strictly construed the statute by stating that "the scope of § 7433
is limited to those taxpayers against whom the IRS is attempting to
collect.' 4 3 It rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the word taxpayer in
section 7433 is meant to extend to "any person subject to internal
revenue tax." 14 Consequently, an innocent third party, such as an
alleged nominee, may not sue the United States under section 7433 for
wrongful tax collection actions.41'
In sum, an alleged nominee is denied due process at every turn.
First, the alleged nominee cannot participate in CDP proceedings
because the Service has determined that such rights only extend to "the
taxpayer."" Second, while section 6901 could provide a mechanism
for the application of CDP to transferees, courts and the Service have
taken the position that nominees are not transferees within the
meaning of the statute.4"7 Consequently, alleged nominees are denied
such rights as the right to participate in collections due process
proceedings, the right to petition the Tax Court, and the right to seek an
408. See Matrix Dev. Corp. v. United States, 815 E Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Wis. 1993);
see also Ferrel v. Brown, 847 E Supp. 1524, 1528 (WD. Wash. 1993), aff' 40 F.3d 1049 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that section 7433 suits are limited to claims by the direct taxpayer from
whom the Service collected the tax); Wilkerson v. United States, 839 E Supp. 440, 443 (E.D.
Tex. 1993) (holding that section 7433, which allows a "taxpayer" to seek such civil damages
against the United States, applies only to actions by the specific taxpayer against whom the
Service's collection efforts were directed).
409. Matrix, 815 E Supp. at 299.
410. Id. at 300.
411. Id
412. Id. at 301.
413. Id. at 301.
414. Id at 300-01.
415. Id. at 302.
416. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7, 301.6330-1(a)(3), Q&A-A2 (as
amended in 2007).
417. See Kellogg v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 167, 175 (1987); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL,
supranote 5, §§ 5.17.2.4.8.2, 5.17.14.1, 5.17.14.3.1.
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offer in compromise.4"8 Finally, the nominee lacks additional rights
that are available to taxpayers and transferees, such as the right to an
administrative appeal of an erroneous tax lien and the right to sue the
United States for an unauthorized collection action. 9 As a result,
alleged nominees have a limited number of ways in which to protect
their interests in comparison to taxpayers who are, likewise, the targets
of collection actions. In the next Part, we explore the actions that an
alleged nominee can take in lieu of those described above. The
avenues available to an alleged nominee are different in kind and scope
from those available to taxpayers and transferees.
VI. WHAT CAN A NOMINEE Do?
Despite the regularity with which nominee lien cases are
adjudicated in court, they are procedurally difficult for the target of the
lien.42 Once the Service has determined that a person is a nominee,
the person, who is frequently unrepresented, must choose between
alternative routes to challenge the lien.42' These routes can be
categorized as either administrative or judicial, and they are not
mutually exclusive.422 Of the two administrative procedures commonly
pursued by taxpayers in Service collection actions, only one is
available to the nominee: the Collection Appeals Program (CAP)."23
For reasons discussed below, this program has limited usefulness in the
nominee context. A broader, more useful administrative option-the
CDP hearing-is unavailable. "
The judicial procedures available to an alleged nominee fall into
two categories: active and passive."25 If an alleged nominee wants to
take an active role, she may pay the assessed liability on the property,
file an administrative refund claim and thereafter file a refund suit in
418. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supm note 5, § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007); id.
§ 5.17.14.3.1 (2000); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-17-020, supra note 367, at 2.
419. See supra PartVC.-D.
420. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supm note 5, § 5.12.2.6.4 (stating that a
nominee is not entitled to CDP procedures but may appeal under the Collection Appeals
Program); I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, supra note 310, at 1 (stating that Collection Appeals Program
procedures, unlike CDP procedures, do not allow for judicial review).
421. SeeinfaPartVI.
422. See infa Part VI. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to
judicial review in some of the instances discussed below.
423. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007).
424. Id
425. See supraPart IV
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district court."6 Another active procedure the nominee may consider is
a suit to quiet title under 28 U.S.C. § 24 10.427 If the nominee prefers a
passive role, she may wait for the Service to levy on her property.
28
Once the Service delivers a notice of levy, she may challenge the levy
in the district court under section 7426.9
A. Administrative Procedures
1. Amicable Joint Challenge with the Taxpayer
As noted above, according to the Service, a nominee against
whom the Service has assessed a tax liability does not have any right
to a CDP hearing under section 6320.430 Depending upon the factual
circumstances and the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer resides,
however, it may be feasible to collaborate with the taxpayer whose debt
resulted in the lien.43' A collaboration of this sort, in which the alleged
nominee would act as a behind-the-scenes participant, could have both
positive and negative aspects.
If collaboration is a viable option, the taxpayer from whose debt
the lien arose may request a CDP hearing by completing Form 12153
"Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing."32 On the form, a
taxpayer must provide the reasons underlying her request for relief,
which could include information and arguments related to the nominee
lien.433 The taxpayer may also raise the appropriateness of other
aspects of the Service's collection action: collection alternatives such
as an installment agreement, offer in compromise, posting a bond, or
substitution of other assets; appropriate spousal defenses; and the
existence or amount of tax, but only if the taxpayer did not receive a
notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an opportunity to
dispute the tax liability.
43
426. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 530 (1995) (describing a plaintiff
who took these steps).
427. I.R.C. § 2410 (2000).
428. Id. § 6331 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (authorizing the Service to collect unpaid
taxes by levy upon the property subject to a lien).
429. Id. § 7426 (2000).
430. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.12.2.6.4 (2007); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6320-1(a)(2), Q&A-A7 (as amended in 2007).
431. See Forman v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,418, at 88,194
(N.D. Ill. 2005). In Forman, the Northern District of Illinois held that it had no jurisdiction
over a husband's claim regarding a nominee lien against his wife's property. Id. This,
however, does not prevent a taxpayer from raising the issue in an administrative hearing.
432. I.R.S. Form 12153 (rev. Nov. 2006).
433. Seeid.
434. I.R.S. Notice CC-2006-019, supa note 56, at 19-22.
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The option for early administrative review of evidence regarding
ownership and transferal of property is the primary reason why an
alleged nominee would attempt to work behind the scenes with a
taxpayer to defeat the nominee lien. The opportunity to present
additional information to the Service can be very valuable. In rare
instances, a taxpayer in a CDP hearing may successfully argue against
his own interest that the property at issue properly belongs to the
alleged nominee. More likely, however, collaboration with the
taxpayer will be useful only in more limited circumstances, namely,
those where the taxpayer is willing to assume responsibility for the
liability. For instance, section 6325 provides that the Service may
release the lien in return for a bond or substitute property, or the
Service may release the lien if the taxpayer's remaining assets are
sufficiently in excess of the amount owed.435 The Service may also
release the lien if it accepts a taxpayer's offer in compromise.436 Where
such agreements reduce the amount of the debt owed, the taxpayer may
advocate for release of the nominee's property rather than his own.
Because the taxpayer, rather than the alleged nominee, is responsible
for strategy and advocacy in the CDP hearing, such an approach
should not preclude the nominee from pursuing remedies on her own
behalf.
Although it may sometimes be productive, taxpayer collaboration
must be regarded with caution and skepticism. It cannot lead to
judicial review of the alleged nominee's status because the taxpayer
does not have a justiciable interest at stake. '37 In addition, the
taxpayer's advocacy of an alleged nominee's position is, in effect,
advocacy against the taxpayer's position. In other words, a nominee
lien shifts a portion of the taxpayer's debt onto the alleged nominee,
and only an honest person would argue in favor of resumption of that
debt. The unfortunate effect of this economic requisite is that the
taxpayer has no incentive to aid the nominee in the disposition of the
nominee lien. Furthermore, collaboration that is open and notorious,
or even collaboration that is kept secret but is discoverable in litigation,
may work against the alleged nominee if the taxpayer's CDP effort
fails. In such a case, the Service will have evidence that the nominee
435. I.R.C. § 6325(a)(2) (2000) (providing that the Service may release the lien in
return for a bond or substitute property).
436. I.R.C. § 7122 (West Supp. 2007).
437. See Forman v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,418, at 88,194
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that because the husband had disclaimed interest in the property
subject to the nominee lien, he lacked an injury that would establish his standing to sue).
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and the taxpayer remain in contact, and it may seek to use the
taxpayer's willingness to make a financial sacrifice for the nominee as
evidence of a close relationship. These facts cut against an alleged
nominee's argument that the property transfer in question was valid,
and they may allow the Service to depict the alleged nominee and
taxpayer as a single economic unit rather than two disinterested parties
who entered into an arm's length transaction.
Finally, even if the potential benefit of collaboration outweighs its
evidentiary risk, it is procedurally difficult to coordinate. The Service
is required to notify a taxpayer that it has filed an NFTL within five
days of the filing.438 The taxpayer then has thirty days to request a
hearing with the Office of Appeals.439 A nominee lien, however, is
processed separately.' The taxpayer's thirty-day window, and indeed,
his collection due process hearing, may come and go before the
Service pursues an alleged nominee's property. As a result, a
collaborative effort will only be possible in those cases where either
the taxpayer anticipates the nominee lien or where the Service's
revenue officer is both informed and efficient in collection.
Unfortunately, it is uninformed and inefficient revenue officers who
are most likely to be the culprits in attachments of erroneous nominee
liens. As a result, collaborative effort will likely be impossible in those
few cases where it could be beneficial.
2. The Collection Appeals Program
The CAP, which provides a narrower opportunity for review, is
more widely available than the CDP hearing."' CAP coverage
includes administrative appeals of federal tax liens, including nominee
liens; levies on wages, property or bank accounts; the seizure of
property; and the denial or termination of an installment agreement. 2
CAP allows an alleged nominee to appeal the lien before or after the
Service files it, and it also allows the administrative appeal of denied
requests to withdraw an NFTL."' While the CAP procedure is quicker
than other options and is available to many individuals under a variety
438. I.R.C. § 6320(a)(2) (2000).
439. Id. § 6320(a)(3); I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, supra note 310, at 1.
440. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.12.2.6.5 (2007) (describing
the process for preparing a nominee lien).
441. I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, supa note 310, at 3 ("The CAP procedure is available under
more circumstances than Collection Due Process (CDP).").
442. Id.
443. See id. (outlining the procedures available under CAP and noting that a taxpayer
may bring an appeal under CAP either before or after the Service has filed a lien).
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of circumstances, a major disadvantage of the procedure is that once
the Office of Appeals has reached a decision, there is no right to
judicial review of that decision."
CAP proceedings may be separated into two categories: those
where contact is initiated by the taxpayer and those where it is initiated
by a revenue officer."5 As a result of the Service's internal procedure,
it is usually the first category of CAP proceedings that is relevant to an
alleged nominee. This is because the Service, although not required by
statute to do so, typically sends a notice of federal tax lien designated
"nominee" or "alter ego" to an alleged nominee."6 The notice provides
the nominee with notice of the problem and an impetus to confront the
Service.
According to IRS Publication 1660, if an individual is interested
in pursuing a CAP proceeding and has been in contact with the
Service only via notice, the individual must contact the Service to
describe the actions which are in dispute, to explain why there is
disagreement, and to present a solution to the controversy." If an
agreement cannot be reached, the individual must notify the Service
that he wishes to appeal its decision." 8 The Service employee whom
the individual has contacted must honor the request and refer the
individual to a manager."9 Within twenty-four hours, a manager will
contact the individual, at which time the manager, after listening to the
individual's basis for disagreement, will make a decision on the case. °
If the individual disagrees with the decision of the manager, the case
will be sent to an appeals officer for review.'
The second category of CAP proceedings applies to an individual
who has been contacted by a revenue officer regarding the collection
action.5 2 Although this category is a less likely fit, it may apply to
alleged nominees in some instances. An individual who disagrees with
the revenue officer's decision and wishes to appeal under CAP must
444. Id. (stating that a taxpayer "cannot proceed to court if [the taxpayer does not]
agree with Appeals' decision in [the] CAP case").
445. Id. (explaining the CAP process in cases where the taxpayer initiates contact with
the Service and alternatively, where the taxpayer has been contacted by a Revenue Officer or
has received an NFTL).
446. SeeTreas. Dep't Ltr. 3177 (DO) (rev. Apr. 2003).








request a conference with a collection manager.4"3 If, after the
conference, the issue has not been resolved, the individual may request
an administrative appeal by completing Form 9423 Collection Appeal
Request and presenting a proposed solution to the dispute.4 ' It must
be postmarked within two days of the conference with the collection
manager. 5' If the request for an appeal is not sent within this time
frame, the Service may resume the collection action if that action has
been suspended. '56 After an appeals request on a lien, levy, or seizure
has been timely submitted, the Service may suspend or continue
suspension of its collection action while the appeals office considers
the case, but it will not do so if suspension might put the collection
action at risk.457
Of most importance, the decision made by the appeals officer is
binding on the case.58 Both the individual and the Service are bound
by the decision, and neither may seek judicial review.9 This is the
primary and great disadvantage of pursuing CAP review. In instances
where the Service has very little evidence about the alleged nominee,
and where the alleged nominee can favorably fill informational gaps,
the CAP review may be useful. These situations, however, may be few
and far between. Prior to giving notice of a nominee lien, the Service
must obtain written approval from its in-house attorneys, who are
higher ranked than appeals officers. 6' Because the decision of an
alleged nominee's status has already been reviewed by legal counsel
for the Service, it is unlikely that the appeals office, which is staffed
primarily by nonlawyers, will render a favorable decision except in the
most egregious circumstances. Accordingly, the CAP process is rarely
useful to an alleged nominee.
B. JudicialProcedures
Where administrative procedures fail, judicial procedures may
succeed but only for alleged nominees who have time, patience, and
sufficient funds. Three judicial courses of action are available to
453. Id. IR.S. Publication 1660 does not discuss the means by which an individual
that wishes to appeal must request a conference.
454. Id.; see also I.R.S. Form 9423 (rev. Jan. 1999) (including instructions on
submitting Form 9423 for the request of an administrative appeal).
455. I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, supra note 310, at 3.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 4.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. INTERNAL REvENuE MANuAL, supm note 5, § 5.12.2.6.5 (2007).
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alleged nominees, and each has significant drawbacks. A nominee
may pursue a suit for refund, ' a suit to quiet title to the disputed
property,'62 or a wrongful levy suit." 3 These actions, like nontax
actions, can be both lengthy and expensive."
1. Suit for Refund
A nominee who has sufficient funds and who is sufficiently sure
of success may pay the liability asserted against her property and claim
a refund." 5 This, however, has not always been the case. Nominees'
battle for access to the refund suit has been a protracted one.46 Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v Williams, discussed
above, there was conflict between the circuits as to whether a person
who had not been assessed tax liability, but who paid the taxes of
another under the duress of a federal tax lien, could bring an action to
recover such payments."67 The Williams court directly addressed this
issue, albeit in a limited factual circumstance and without resolving
other important questions, such as whether the merits of the underlying
assessment can be challenged; whether a voluntary third-party payor,
who did not remit funds under duress, can institute a refund action;
and whether the existence of another remedy, such as a wrongful levy
action, precludes the availability of a refund suit.466
The issue before the Court in Williams was whether the waiver of
sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) authorized a refund suit
by a party who had paid tax under protest to remove a federal tax lien
from her property, even though the tax was not assessed against her.469
In addressing the Service's argument that the Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the refund suit, the Court looked to the explicit
language of § 1346(a)(1), which is broadly rendered as follows:
461. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000).
462. Id. § 2410.
463. I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1) (2000).
464. See cases cited infia notes 503-507. Because attorneys generally charge by the
hour, protracted litigation can result in ballooning legal expenses.
465. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 529 (1995) (describing an alleged
nominee who paid the liability and sued for a refund).
466. See, e.g., Snodgrass v. United States, 834 E2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1987) (ruling
that a nominee could not sue the United States for a refund).
467. Compare Martin v. United States, 895 E2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1990) (permitting a
suit for refund by a person who had paid the taxes of another), with Snodgrass, 834 E2d at
539 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a refund suit by a person who had paid the tax liability
of another).
468. Williams, 514 U.S. at 535-36.
469. Id. at 530.
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"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the United States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of
any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected
without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collectedunder the internal-revenue laws. .. ,,"70
The Court pointed out that this language does not restrict the
availability of suit to the person against whom the taxes are assessed;
the language encompasses more."' The Court held that Ms. Williams'
plea to recover tax "erroneously ... collected" by the Service fell
squarely within the language of the statute."2
Williams struck a blow on behalf of third-party payors, but if
limited to its facts, its impact is limited to a rare and specific group of
persons, to wit, those who are able to pay under duress. 3 When
applying the Williams analysis, some courts may be unwilling to
extend standing to third parties that pay the tax liability of another in
the absence of duress.47 ' Nonetheless, the refund suit remains an
important, although severely limited, option.
2. Suit To Quiet Title
In situations where an alleged nominee cannot or does not wish
to pay the debtor's tax liability and thereafter sue for a refund, she may
seek predeprivation relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1) by filing a suit
to quiet title. 5 The statute provides that
the United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any
district court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter ... to quiet title to ... real or personal property on which the
United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.476
The words quiet title include a suit to clear the cloud resulting from a
federal tax lien.7
470. Id. at 532 (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1988 and Supp.
V 1993)).
471. Id. at 536.
472. Id. at 532.
473. Id. at 540.
474. Id ("We do not decide the circumstances, if any, under which a party who
volunteers to pay a tax assessed against someone else may seek a refund under § 1346(a).").
475. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1) (2000); see also Williams, 514 U.S. at 538 (describing
predeprivation remedies).
476. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a).
477. SeeUnited States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1961).
840 [Vol. 82:781
COLLECTION DUE PROCESS
The waiver of sovereign immunity found in § 2410 is important
to alleged nominees because a favorable judgment in a quiet title
action against the government "shall have the same effect respecting
the discharge of the property from the ... lien held by the United
States as may be provided with respect to such matters by the local law
of the place where the court is situated."78 In order to obtain such a
judgment, the section requires that the person filing the suit plead with
particularity, and in the case of actions or suits involving liens arising
under internal revenue laws, "the complaint or pleading shall include
the name and address of the taxpayer whose liability created the lien
and, if a notice of the tax lien was filed, the identity of the internal
revenue office which filed the notice."479 In addition, service of
process upon the United States in such cases must be made by serving
a copy of the complaint on the U.S. attorney for the district in which
the action is brought or any other prescribed person as designated by
the U.S. attorney as provided in § 2410(b)."8'
To an alleged nominee, a suit to quiet title presents distinct
advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, it provides the
alleged nominee with a forum for adjudication of the validity of the
Service's action. Such a forum is otherwise unavailable-unlike
"transferees" under section 6901, alleged nominees do not have access
to the prelevy administrative process or to the Tax Court. 8' Better yet,
a court faced with a quiet title action is not limited to a review of the
Service's administrative record.482 Rather, it accepts new evidence.483
This aspect of the suit is important because the Service does not
always consult the alleged nominee when determining whether to
place a lien on property. 4" As a result, it may miss key facts and later
478. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c).
479. Id § 2410(b).
480. Id The section further provides that one may also properly serve an
[A]ssistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United
States attorney in writing filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is
brought and by sending copies of the process and complaint ... to the Attorney
General of the United States at Washington, [D.C.]. In such actions the United
States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty days after such service
or such further time as the court may allow.
Id.
481. See supra Part VB.
482. See Juno Inv. Corp. v. United States, 93 A.ET.R.2d (RIA) 2631, 2633 (D. Minn.
2004).
483. Id.
484. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.12.2.6.5 (2007) (describing
the process for preparing a nominee lien).
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refuse to consider them. A suit to quiet title provides the alleged
nominee with a venue in which to present information that the Service
may not have considered. Finally, a suit to quiet title may be
advantageous because it can be filed in either state or federal court. 5
This versatility may allow an alleged nominee a wider selection of
counsel from which to choose and may be of particular importance to
low income taxpayers accused of holding a tax debtor's property
(although any counsel not acting pro bono is likely to be expensive).
Although it has benefits, a suit to quiet title also has drawbacks.
First and foremost, an alleged nominee bears the burden of proof in a
quiet title suit."6 Whereas section 6902 specifies that in transferee
cases "the burden of proof shall be upon the Secretary to show that a
petitioner is liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer," 7 in a
quiet title action, the alleged nominee bears the burden of proof."' In
addition, the government is entitled to a presumption of administrative
regularity in quiet title actions."9 An alleged nominee can only
overcome this presumption by producing credible evidence that the
Service did not follow a statutorily mandated procedure."' Even then,
the Service may introduce proof to show that despite the alleged
nominee's evidence, its assessment and collection procedures were
appropriate."' The shifted burden of proof and presumption of
regularity in a quiet title action leave an alleged nominee at a distinct
disadvantage in comparison to transferees who may benefit from
section 6902.
A second disadvantage of quiet title suits is the length of time and
the amount of resources needed for their prosecution. Although this
problem is by no means unique to quiet title actions, it is particularly
troublesome to an alleged nominee who is denied the ability to
mortgage or alienate property. In summary, while a quiet title suit may
be an attractive option for an alleged nominee with an abundance of
time, money, and evidence, it is a less than ideal solution in most
485. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a) (2000). The Service is, of course, not precluded from
seeking removal from state to federal court in appropriate cases.
486. See Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Virgin Islands, 757 F2d 534, 541
(3d Cir. 1985).
487. I.R.C. § 6902(a) (2000).
488. See AexanderHamilton Life ns. Co. of Am., 757 E2d at 541.
489. See Coplin v. United States, No. 91-1338, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30335, at *9
(6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1991).
490. Id
491. Id.; Sumpter v. United States, 302 E Supp. 2d 707, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (stating
that because the plaintiffs produced prima facie evidence of valid title, the burden shifted to
the Service to prove that its liens took precedence over the alleged nominees' interests).
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instances. It does not afford a timely solution and, more importantly, it
shifts the burden of proof to the alleged nominee. '92 Finally, bringing a
quiet title suit remains an expensive option. Accordingly, it is not a
viable alternative in many cases.
3. Wrongful Levy Action
An alleged nominee who is unable or unwilling to pursue a
refund action or a quiet title suit will be forced to take a reactive, rather
than an active, approach. The alleged nominee must wait for the
Service to levy the property in question. Afterward, she can bring a
wrongful levy under section 7426(a)(1). 93 The statute states in relevant
part:
If a levy has been made on property or property has been sold
pursuant to a levy, and any person (other than the person against whom
is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who claims an interest
in or lien on such property and that such property was wrongfully
levied upon may bring a civil action against the United States in a
district court of the United States. Such action may be brought without
regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the
Secretary.494
To prevail in a wrongful levy suit, an alleged nominee must show
that the levy was wrongful and that her interest is superior to that of the
United States.495 A levy is wrongful when it is made against property496that does not belong to the delinquent taxpayer. Unlike a quiet title
action, the burden of persuasion in a wrongful levy action falls initially
upon the Service, which must show that the taxpayer has an interest in
the seized property497 or that there is a nexus between the taxpayer and
the seized property.98 If the government carries its burden, the onus
shifts to the alleged nominee to prove that the delinquent taxpayer has
no interest in the levied property.
499
Despite its favorable distribution of the burden of proof, the
wrongful levy suit has an obvious and nearly fatal drawback: it is not
available until the Service levies the alleged nominee's property. In
492. See Coplin, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30335, at *9.
493. I.R.C. § 7426(a)(1) (2000).
494. Id.
495. Bremen Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 131 E3d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir. 1997).
496. SeePate v. United States, 949 E2d 1059, 1060 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[A] tax lien can
attach only to a property interest owned by the delinquent taxpayer... ).
497. Sec. Counselors, Inc. v. United States, 860 E2d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 1988).
498. Oxford Capital Corp. v. United States, 211 E3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2000).
499. Id.
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other words, under section 7426(a)(1), the alleged nominee cannot
bring suit until the Service has seized the liened-against property. This
is no minor inconvenience because under section 6502(a)(1), the
Service has at least a decade during which to levy against the alleged
nominee."°
The Service, as one might imagine, is not built for speed, and
litigating a federal case is also a long process."' Even a brief look at
wrongful levy and foreclosure cases reveals that tax collection actions
put peoples' lives on hold, not for weeks or months, but for years."2
For instance, the wrongful levy case of Hatchett v United States opens,
"This case began more than twenty-five years ago .... ,503 Likewise,
the court in United States v Scherping rendered a decision on a
foreclosure action that the Service began seventeen years earlier."° In
United States v Swan, the court rendered a foreclosure decision
eighteen years after the taxpayers' debt arose.05 And even the oft-cited
Towe case was lengthy; the Service waited until 1989 to attack a 1981
transfer of property to an alleged nominee."6 The appellate court
finally rendered its decision in 1993, twelve years after the contested
transfer."7 Because these actions, and the collection procedures that
precede them, are so lengthy, the wrongful levy suit is not a viable
option for alleged nominees who need to improve, leverage, or dispose
of their property.
C Summary of the Available Remedies
A handful of administrative and judicial avenues are available to
an alleged nominee who wishes to challenge the Service's action, but
none of them are satisfactory for a person who is wrongly accused,
particularly if that person is of limited means or has limited time. In
addition, the available remedies are not coextensive with those
provided to similarly situated taxpayers and transferees.
Administratively, an alleged nominee could challenge the Service's
500. I.R.C. § 6502 (2000). "
501. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, A Cap on the Defendant Appeal Bond?" Punitive
Damages Tort Reform, 39 AKRON L. REv. 1089, 1113 (2006) ("Litigation takes a long time.").
502. SeeUnited States v. Swann, 467 E3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2006); Hatchett v. United
States, 2003 FED App. 0176P, T 3 (6th Cir.); United States v. Scherping, 187 F3d 796, 799
(8th Cir. 1999).
503. 2003 FEDApp. 0176P, 3 (6thCir.).
504. 187 E3d at 799.
505. 467 E3d at 656.
506. Towe Antique Ford Found. v. IRS, 791 E Supp. 1450, 1451-52 (D. Mont. 1992),
affU 999 E2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993).
507. Towe, 999 F2d at 1387.
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action via the CAP or possibly work together with the actual taxpayer
in an amicable joint challenge of the lien by way of a CDP hearing.
Both of these avenues, however, may present considerable problems.
If the alleged nominee uses CAP, she loses her ability to seek judicial
review of the Appeals Officer's final decision, which is binding on
both parties."8 An amicable joint challenge with the "taxpayer" raises
difficult issues, such as justiciability of the taxpayer's interest, the
necessary personal relationship between the "taxpayer" and the
nominee, and the effect of that relationship on the Service's
determination of the alleged nominee's status. Furthermore, the CAP
challenge is unlikely to succeed because, in most cases, a nominee lien
is preapproved by attorneys within the Service who outrank the
appeals officers that are assigned to the CAP process."9 The odds,
then, of prevailing administratively under either procedure are not
favorable.
An alleged nominee may also consider judicial remedies,
including a refund suit, a suit to quiet title, or a wrongful levy suit.
Each of these actions has at least one serious drawback. In a refund
suit, the alleged nominee must pay the tax debtor's liability." In a suit
to quiet title, the alleged nominee bears the burden of disproving the
government's interest."' Finally, in a wrongful levy action, the alleged
nominee must wait for the Service to levy on liened-upon property,
which could take a decade.5 2 In each of these cases, the alleged
nominee is forced to cover the cost of court and counsel and is denied
the ability to alienate his or her property for years. Although these
suits may eventually bring the alleged nominee satisfaction in a
technical sense, none of them can truly be described as satisfying.
Finally, they are quantitatively different from the procedures available
to similarly situated taxpayers and transferees.
VII. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
Taxpayers, transferees, and alleged nominees are similarly
situated in collections actions in a crucial aspect: each holds property
that the Service seeks to seize. The goals of the RRA-to curb abuses
of power, to prevent unauthorized collections, and to provide a forum
508. I.R.S. Publ'n 1660, supra note 310, at 3.
509. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, suplanote 5, § 5.12.2.6.5. (2007).
510. SeeUnited States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 540 (1995).
511. See Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Virgin Islands, 757 F.2d 534, 541 (3d
Cir. 1985).
512. I.R.C. §§ 7426(a)(1), 6502(a) (2000).
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for settlement-are equally relevant to each group. The facially
obvious distinctions among the groups, based on subjective intent and
the origin of liability, have no bearing on the Service's collection
function. Neither can the difference in collection processes be
justified on the basis of unclean hands. A nominee complicit in tax
avoidance is in the same position, vis-A-vis the Service, as a tax debtor
or the recipient of fraudulently conveyed property.
Technical distinctions based upon transfer of title are similarly
unhelpful. One could make a technical argument that because the
transferor in a fraudulent conveyance transaction actually conveys
property, the conveyance may defeat the automatic lien that arises
against all of a tax debtor's property under section 6321. If the
automatic lien is defeated, separate assessment and administrative
processes, and a separate lien, are needed to collect against the
transferee under section 6901. In contrast, if the transfer to an alleged
nominee is merely a legal fiction, the transfer would not defeat the
automatic lien under section 6321, and no separate assessment would
be necessary under section 6901. This technical distinction would
make the utmost sense as a basis for discrimination against alleged
nominees but for a single fact: the legal test for fraudulent conveyance
and the legal test for nominee status are, by and large, identical.
Despite their nearly identical descriptions, the Service's treatment
of fraudulent conveyance collections and nominee collections are
dissimilar in quantity, quality, and timing. As described in detail
above, the discrepancies are not minor. While taxpayers and
transferees have full access to the provisions of sections 6320 and
6330, alleged nominees do not."3 Transferees and taxpayers have the
right to notice of the Service's lien filing, an administrative hearing, an
administrative appeal, and a judicial appeal, while alleged nominees do
not."4 Furthermore, in judicial proceedings, section 6902 places the
onus of proving transferee status on the Service, while in nominee
cases, it is the nominee who bears the burden of proof.15
Because no viable reason exists for disparate treatment of
taxpayers, transferees, and alleged nominees, we propose that all
targets of Service collection actions be afforded equal treatment. This
goal could be accomplished quickly and easily through an amendment
513. ScesupraPartV
514. SeesupaPartV
515. See supm Part VI.B.
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to section 6901 and the Treasury Regulations that defines transferee.'6
Although the existing provisions could, and as a matter of fairness
should, apply to alleged nominees, the Service has not interpreted
them as such. Therefore, Congress and the Treasury should make
clear that nominees are transferees not only in everyday parlance but
also in the application of section 6901. Doing so would put alleged
nominees on the same footing as other targets of collection actions, be
that favorable or unfavorable ground, and it would prevent the Service
from selecting the level of due process afforded to a third-party
collections case through its choice of transferee or nominee status.
Thus, our proposed amendment would create a more equitable
collections process while rendering that process less susceptible to
governmental abuse.
516. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1(b) (1967) ("As used in this section, the term
"transferee" includes an heir, legatee, devisee, distributee of an estate of a deceased person,
the shareholder of a dissolved corporation, the assignee or donee of an insolvent person, the
successor of a corporation, a party to a reorganization as defined in section 368, and all other
classes ofdistributees." (emphasis added)).
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